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Abstract 
We analyze the effect of municipal employees’ political representation in municipal 
councils on local public spending. We use within-party, as-good-as random variation in 
close elections in the Finnish open-list proportional election system to quantify the effect. 
One more councilor employed by the public sector increases spending by about one 
percent. The effect comes largely through the largest party and is specific to the 
employment sector of the municipal employee. The results are consistent with public 
employees having an information advantage over other politicians, and thus, being able to 
influence policy.   
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Introduction 
In 2013, public sector employees accounted on average for 21% of total employment in the 
OECD countries (OECD 2015). While heterogeneous, they are a large group that share an 
interest in sustaining public employment and that can influence politics in various ways. In 
addition to a direct voting channel (Garand 1988; Blais, Blake, and Dion 1990; Bhatti and 
Hansen 2012), recent research has emphasized the role of public sector unions and their 
effects on the cost of government, either directly through collective bargaining or indirectly 
through politics (Sieg and Wang 2013; Anzia and Moe 2015). 
Quite often public sector employees are also politicians themselves.1 This dual role of 
public sector employees has raised the concern that when elected, they may be in a better 
position to extract rents from holding the office than otherwise similar politicians. A 
concrete example would be a teacher in a municipal council that decides whether the 
teacher’s school should be closed or not, or a public sector nurse participating in deciding 
on budget cuts in the local public health care sector. In both cases, the public sector 
employees can possibly exert disproportionate influence in the council due to their 
information advantage over the other councilors on the true costs and benefits of providing 
public services in their sector of employment (Niskanen 1971; Romer and Rosenthal 1979). 
This disproportionate influence may compromise the political neutrality of public service 
and also undermine the separation powers more generally (Braendle and Stutzer 2016). 
                                                 
1 For example, Braendle and Stutzer (2016) report that in their sample of 76 countries the 
average fraction of politicians in national parliaments with a public sector background is 
31.3%. 
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Consistent with such concerns, countries often impose incompatibility and to a lesser 
extent ineligibility rules on the political involvement of public sector employees.2 The 
former force public employees to give up public service if elected and the latter require 
giving up public service if they run (Braendle and Stutzer 2016). Imposing such restrictions 
involves a trade-off by limiting the political participation of a group with possibly ample 
opportunities for rent-seeking at the cost of discriminating against a large citizen group and 
excluding informed candidates.3 There is surprisingly little evidence on whether public 
sector employees would act differently from the other politicians when elected. We start to 
fill this important gap in the literature by providing causal evidence on how municipal 
employee representation in a municipal council affects local public spending and on the 
mechanisms at work.4 
We use data from Finland. Finland provides a particularly interesting context for our 
analysis for two reasons. First, almost 30% of employment in Finland is in the public sector 
and more than 20% of employment is in the local public sector.5 An important feature of 
Finnish local politics, and common in other countries as well (e.g. the UK), is that being a 
municipal councilor is not a full-time job. About one quarter of the Finnish local politicians 
                                                 
2 Prominent examples include the Hatch Act of 1939 in the US and the House of Commons 
Disqualification Act of 1975 in the UK. The Local Government Act of 1972 and the Local 
Government and Housing Act 1989 include similar restrictions for local government 
employees in the UK. See Braendle and Stutzer (2016) for examples from other countries.  
3 Braendle and Stutzer (2010, 2016) show using German and cross-country data, 
respectively, that stricter ineligibility and incompatibility rules decrease the share of public 
servants in parliaments. Rosenson (2006) finds a connection between various ethics laws 
and representation of occupations. Braendle (2016) reviews the effects of institutions and 
eligibility rules on political selection. 
4 Prior analyses closest to ours are Braendle and Stutzer (2013, 2016), but neither focuses 
on estimating causal effects. For example, Braendle and Stutzer (2016) find using cross-
country data a positive association between government size and the share of public 
servants in parliament.  
5 Source: Statistics Finland Labor Force Survey 2015.  
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work for a municipality.6 The distribution of power between private and public sector 
employees in the municipal councils may therefore have a large impact on the size and 
efficiency of the local public sector. Reflecting this tension and its topicality, the Finnish 
media has expressed concerns that when elected, municipal employees can make decisions 
on their own jobs in municipal councils.7  
The second reason why Finland provides a suitable context for our study is that the 
Finnish open-list local elections provide us with plausibly exogenous variation in municipal 
employee representation. The source of this variation is candidate-level close contests 
within party lists. We use these contests to construct a municipality-level instrument 
variable for municipal employee representation. Our instrument captures the extent to 
which the seat share of municipal employees exceeds or falls short of their expected share 
due to randomness in the outcomes of the close elections. The identifying assumption is 
that when measured at the candidate level and sufficiently close to the within party election 
thresholds, the seat allocation between municipal employees and other candidates can be 
considered to be as-good-as random. This assumption can be tested indirectly by covariate 
balance tests. We define candidate-level closeness within the party lists to make sure that 
differences in party representation (party effects) are not driving the results.  
Our main result is that electing one additional municipal employee to a council as 
opposed to a candidate from the same party, but not employed by the public sector, 
increases local public spending. Our estimates suggest that in a municipality with a median-
sized council (27 seats), the spending increases on average by about 1 percent over the 
                                                 
6 In Finland, municipal employees are eligible to run for a council seat and can hold on to 
their municipal job if elected. There are, however, other restrictions (see section 
Institutional Setting and Data). 
7 For example, the Finnish National Broadcasting company YLE expressed at the time of 
the 2012 municipal council elections the concern that municipal employees can decide on 
their own jobs in municipal councils.  
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four-year council term. The effect is surprisingly large considering two features: First, we 
are probably looking at a relatively unimportant margin, i.e., the last elected candidate 
within a party to a council that typically consists of tens of councilors. Second, as we 
explain later, there are explicit restrictions on the types of political positions that Finnish 
municipal employees can take in their home municipality. Our result is nevertheless in line 
with previous findings which show that smaller parties and even individual councilors have 
an effect on policy in proportional representation systems (Folke 2014; Freier and 
Odendahl 2015; Fiva and Halse 2016).8  
We also provide evidence on the mechanisms at work. First, we show that the effect 
varies by the type of municipal employee and the type of spending: electing one more 
employee who works in health care leads to a significant increase in health expenditures, 
but not in the other (non-health) municipal expenditures. Similarly, when a non-health care 
employee gets elected, expenditures unrelated to health care increase.9 This evidence is 
consistent with Niskanen’s (1971) classic bureaucracy model which predicts that 
bureaucrats can convince politicians to increase public spending due to their information 
advantage over politicians. The analogy we draw is that municipal employee politicians 
have both different incentives than and information advantage over the other politicians. 
Moreover, we find that the positive effect on local public spending arises in particular in 
close elections that involve the largest party in the municipality and in smaller councils. 
                                                 
8 For studies on party effects in the U.S. context, see Ferreira and Gyourko (2009), Gerber 
and Hopkins (2011) and de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw (2016). The effects of the 
political representation of other non-partisan interests groups, such as women, minorities 
and occupation groups, on policy outcomes are studied by, for instance, Pande (2003), 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), Gehlbach, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2010), Ferreira and 
Gyourko (2014), Matter and Stutzer (2015) and Bagues and Campa (2017). Gagliarducci 
and Nannicini (2013) and Freier and Thomasius (2016) study the effects of politicians’ 
qualifications on fiscal outcomes.  
9 Data limitations prevent us from analyzing occupation groups in more detail. 
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This evidence suggests that municipal employee councilors influence outcomes through 
intra-party decision making (Laver and Shepsle 1990). 
The increased sector-specific spending cannot be automatically attributed to rent-
seeking. A reason for this is that municipal employees are experts in their area of 
employment and can therefore provide useful information to other councilors and improve 
decision-making.10 Even though we cannot conclusively differentiate between the 
competing hypotheses about the efficiency of the increased spending, it is definitely 
noteworthy − and somewhat puzzling − that the Finnish municipal councilors employed by 
the public sector want to increase public expenditures in a country that in 2014 had, at 59% 
(OECD 2015), the highest public sector ratio to GDP among all OECD countries (during 
1996-2012 Finland’s position varied between 2nd and 8th). The uniform increase in spending 
is puzzling because our as-good-as-random design guarantees that the citizens’ needs are 
identical on average in the treated and other municipalities. Viewed from this angle, 
Niskanen’s (1971) concerns about bureaucrats’ information advantage leading to excessive 
spending seem warranted.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we discuss 
relevant theory and outline testable hypotheses. Then, we describe the institutional setting 
and data. We present our econometric identification strategy in the fourth section and the 
results in the fifth section. The final section concludes the study. Auxiliary results are 
available in the Online Appendices. 
 
                                                 
10 We are unable to find systematic evidence for the extra spending being related to rents 
that the politicians employed by the municipalities get from holding the office (through 
better employment opportunities, or greater wages; see Dahlberg and Mörk 2006 and 
Brueckner and Neumark 2014). Neither do we find evidence that the increased spending 
reflects pro-social behavior or competence of public sector employees (Best and Cotta 
2000; Francois 2000; Besley and Ghatak 2003, 2006). 
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Theory and Hypotheses 
We are interested in i) whether, ii) through which mechanisms and iii) why public 
employee representation in municipal councils has an effect on municipal spending. We 
discuss each of these in turn.  
Effect on total expenditures: At least two distinct theoretical debates bear directly 
on whether public employee representation has an effect on local government expenditures. 
The first view is that public employees have both the economic incentives and the means to 
maximize the municipal budget to their own benefit (Niskanen 1971; Courant, Gramlich, 
and Rubinfield 1979; Dahlberg and Mörk 2006). This is likely to obfuscate the separation 
of powers between the executive and the democratically-chosen political branches of the 
local government (Braendle and Stutzer 2016). A public sector employee politician may 
also have a variety of ways to target public spending to certain voters, such as her own 
political constituency or interest group (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 2000). The second 
view posits that the preferences of public sector employees differ systematically from the 
individuals employed by the private sector. One reason for the difference is that 
professional background determines socio-economic conditions and may thus shape 
identity (Braendle and Stutzer 2016). Consistent with this, public sector employees seem to 
be politically more active (Bhatti and Hansen 2012) and lean more to the left ideologically 
(Knutsen 2005; Jensen, Sum, and Flynn 2009; Rattsø and Sørensen 2016). They may also 
be relatively unwilling to support market-oriented solutions, and thus, a smaller public 
sector. 
Taken together, these views suggest that public sector employees have a tendency to 
favor a larger public sector. We therefore formulate the following hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 1: The council seat share of municipal employees increases 
municipal spending.  
We acknowledge the possibility that municipal employees may be more pro-social and 
better motivated for public service than other candidates from the same party (Francois 
2000; Besley and Ghatak 2003, 2006). If that was the case, spending could also decrease 
(remain unchanged) if the status quo level of per capita spending is too high (optimal) from 
the social point of view. Municipal employees may also be relatively immune to specific 
business interests and lobbying (Braendle and Stutzer 2016), which may reduce inefficient 
spending to public procurement.  
Mechanisms at work: How and through which mechanisms could the spending 
effect come about? This question is of interest, because there are institutional restrictions on 
the political representation of the municipal employees (see the next section) and because 
our empirical close-elections approach identifies by design the effect of allocating the last 
marginal seats to the council. Two key mechanisms suggest themselves: First, holding other 
things constant, an individual councilor is likely to exert a greater impact in smaller 
councils because the likelihood of him (or his party) being pivotal is higher. In a smaller 
council, a single councilor can also pivot informal within-council discussions to his own 
advantage and influence which issues the council tackles. Second, the literature on 
coalitional bargaining (Laver and Shepsle 1990) suggests that councilors can influence 
decision making either between-parties or within-parties. In the former case, the municipal 
employees would vote in the council as if they had a coalition of their own, independent of 
the formal parties and the municipal employees’ party affiliation. If, on the other hand, the 
channel of influence is within-parties, the party lines hold, but municipal employee 
councilors affect the policy position of their own party. This is a plausible channel of 
influence in our context because public employees may be a relatively loose and 
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heterogeneous interest group. Moreover, the within-party channel matters for policy 
outcomes only if the public employees’ party is large and powerful enough in the council. 
In sum, we have the following two hypotheses about the mechanisms of influence:  
Hypothesis 2a: Municipal employees of smaller councils have a greater effect 
on spending than those of larger councils.  
Hypothesis 2b: Municipal employees of larger parties have a greater effect on 
spending than those of smaller parties.  
Rent-seeking vs. efficient provision of public services: Finally, we study whether 
the effect of public employee representation on public spending mirrors rent-seeking, or is 
more consistent with efficient provision of public services.  
Applied to our context, Niskanen’s (1971) classic model of bureaucracy predicts that 
municipal employee councilors have an information advantage over the other municipal 
councilors about the provision of public services in their own employment sector and that 
the municipal employees are less likely to have such an advantage over the other public 
services. We therefore formulate:  
Hypothesis 3a: Municipal employees never decrease spending and they 
increase spending especially in their own sector of employment.  
This hypothesis would not get support from the data, if municipal employees lean more to 
the left and generically favor a larger public sector. In this case, municipal employees ought 
to increase spending also in sectors other than their own sector of employment. Moreover, 
while the expertise of municipal employees can also be useful for the efficient provision of 
public services (Braendle and Stutzer 2016), it is unlikely that, holding citizens’ needs 
constant, such efficient provision systematically calls for greater spending, especially only 
in their own sector.  
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Finally, we also look for more direct signs of rent-seeking (Svaleryd and Vlachos 
2009). Inefficiencies may arise also through clientelistic behavior (i.e., explicit or implicit 
quid-pro-quo for political support; see Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 2000), which are at 
least partly captured through better re-election prospects. We therefore formulate:  
Hypothesis 3b: Municipal employees enjoy higher returns to office in terms of 
larger salary and smaller unemployment risk, and/or enjoy from a larger 
incumbency advantage in subsequent elections than the other candidates. 
 
Institutional Setting and Data 
Finnish Local Governments 
Tasks and revenue sources of municipalities: Finland has a two-tier system of 
government consisting of the central government and municipalities as the local level (see 
Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2015). Finnish municipalities have extensive tasks. In addition to 
the usual local public goods and services, municipalities are responsible for providing most 
of social and health care services and primary and secondary education. The GDP share of 
municipality spending is large (roughly 18 percent) and the municipalities employ around 
20 percent of the total workforce.  
Municipalities have extensive fiscal autonomy. The most important revenue source is 
the flat local income tax, determined by the municipalities. There are, however, large 
regional tax base and cost disparities. They are offset by a central government grant system, 
which the municipalities cannot effectively manipulate to their advantage.  
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Decision-making and elections in municipalities: Municipalities are governed by a 
municipality council which is the most important political actor.11 For example, mayors or 
city managers are public officials chosen by the councils and have only executive power 
and no political power. Moreover, municipal boards (i.e., cabinets) have only a preparatory 
role and the representation in the boards follows the political distribution of the council. 
Municipal elections are held simultaneously in all municipalities and each 
municipality has one electoral district. The elections in our data were held on the fourth 
Sunday of October in 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008. The council term starts in January of the 
year following the election year. The term lasts four years.  
Within each municipality, the allocation of seats is based on proportional 
representation, as determined by the open-list D’Hondt election rule. In an election, each 
candidate has an affiliation with a party list and each voter gives a single vote to a single 
candidate. The voters cannot vote for a party without specifying a candidate. The total 
number of votes for the candidates in a given party list determines the votes for each party. 
The party votes determine how many seats each party gets according to the D’Hondt rule. 
Given these party seats, the competition for the seats within parties is simply an n-past-the-
post rule. The rank of a candidate within the party list is determined by his votes, implying 
that voters − as opposed to parties − decide which candidates are elected from a given party 
list.  
                                                 
11 The Finnish law dictates that council size is a step function of population: 13, 15 or 17 
for municipal population of 2000 or less, 21 for 2001–4000; 27 for 4001–8000; 35 for 
8001–15,000; 43 for 15,001–30,000; 51 for 30,001–60,000; 59 for 60,001–120,000; 67 for 
120,001–250,000; 75 for 250,001–400,000 and 85 for over 400,000. 
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There are nation-wide restrictions on the political roles of municipal employees.12 
First, a municipal employee who is in an executive position of a branch of public service 
cannot be a council member. For example, the director of a municipality’s school authority 
cannot be a member of the municipal council. Second, a municipal employee cannot be a 
member of the sub-committee of his own specific sector. For example, a teacher cannot be 
a member of the sub-committee for education. Third, a municipal employee working in 
administrative duties directly under the municipal board cannot be a member of the board. 
Fourth, a municipal employee who is the presenting official for matters dealt by the 
municipal board cannot be a member of the board. Fifth, the majority of the municipal 
board cannot consist of municipal employees. Finally, a municipal employee councilor can 
participate in the decision making in the council meeting even if the matter relates to her 
own employment, unless she has been directly involved in preparing or presenting the 
matter as a bureaucrat for the council.   
The broader institutional context may also limit the opportunities of the municipal 
employees to influence outcomes and extract rents while in office. For example, Finland is 
one of the least corrupted countries in the world. Moreover, wages are largely set at the 
national-level wage bargaining between the municipal employer organization and various 
labor unions. However, a municipality can pay more than agreed upon nationally.  
  
                                                 
12 Most of Finnish local politicians have a normal day job. The task of being a municipal 
councilor typically takes a few hours a week and the monetary compensation involved is 
not nearly enough to live on. The same applies by and large, e.g., to the UK (Local 
Government Association 2012).  
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Data 
Our data come from a number of sources:  
Candidate and elections data: We have obtained data on municipal elections held 
between 1996 and 2008 from the Ministry of Justice. These data consist of candidate-level 
election results, in particular party affiliation, number of votes and elected status. The 
election data also include the age and gender of the candidates. Information on municipal 
employment status comes from KEVA, which manages local government pensions, and we 
have linked the candidate data also to Statistics Finland data on education, occupation and 
socio-economic status and to income data from the Finnish Tax Authority.  
Overall we have roughly 160,000 candidate-election observations (see Appendix A 
for descriptive statistics and descriptions of sample restrictions). For our purposes, a 
candidate is a municipal employee, if she was employed by a municipality at the end of the 
election year. Compared to other candidates, municipal employees are more often female 
(nurse is the most common profession among them), classified as high professionals in 
terms of socioeconomic status and running for the Social Democratic Party. We return to 
these observable differences in candidate characteristics when we present our econometric 
analysis and results. 
Municipal data: We use Statistics Finland’s data on municipal expenditures and 
demographics for years 1996–2012. We have 1544 municipality-council term observations 
(see Appendix A for the summary statistics): On average, municipalities’ total expenditures 
are 5500 euros per capita. The single most important expenditure category is health care 
(1,700 euros per capita). Municipal employees’ seat share is on average 26.4%. 
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Econometric Approach 
Identification Strategy 
To estimate the effect of political representation of municipal employees on municipal 
policy, we use the following regression specification:  
 
 Ymt =  δMmt 	+ X'mtβ +	umt,            (1) 
 
where Ymt is the outcome of interest, Mmt is the seat share of municipal employees in the 
council, X'mt is a vector of control variables (possibly lagged), and umt is the error term in 
municipality m at time t. The parameter of interest is δ which measures the effect of a 
change in the seat share of municipal employees on the outcome. 
Our main outcome variable is municipal expenditures. A simple OLS estimation of 
equation (1) may suffer from both reverse causality and omitted variable bias. This could be 
the case if, e.g., voters in a municipality demand a high level of municipal services. Such a 
municipality would have a high number of municipal employees. This calls for greater 
municipal expenditures and would show up as a greater council seat share of public sector 
employees as well.  
We make use of close elections to estimate the treatment effect of interest (δ). Unlike 
in much of the recent literature using close elections for identification, the Finnish 
municipal election system of proportional representation with open party lists does not 
render itself to a simple regression discontinuity design (RDD) analysis (Lee, Moretti, and 
Butler 2004). The reason is simple: Despite there being an RDD flavor to our close 
elections approach, we cannot construct a well-defined forcing variable at the municipality 
level. We therefore build on Clots-Figueras (2011, 2012) who uses the fraction of women 
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winning close elections as an instrument for the share of women in the legislature (see also 
Folke 2014 and Freier and Odendahl 2015, who use IV and close elections data). Our IV 
procedure uses as-good-as random variation at candidate-level in the close elections and 
aggregates this variation to get a municipality-level instrumental variable. To properly 
capture the treatment effect of political representation of municipal employees, we focus on 
closeness within party lists. This choice means that between-party differences do not 
confound our results. For example, if municipal employees are more often left- than right-
wing, between party comparisons would give us the joint effect of municipal employees 
and party status.13  
We construct our instrument in the following steps: 
Step 1: For each party list p, we define the pivotal number of votes as the average of 
the maximum number of votes among the non-elected candidates and the minimum number 
of votes among the elected candidates. The distance to getting elected for each candidate is 
the number of votes of the candidate minus the pivotal number of votes of her party list. We 
normalize this distance by dividing it by the total number of votes of the party list and then 
multiplying it by 100. We denote the variable thus obtained vipmt.14 Closeness of each 
candidate i in party list p in municipality m in election t, Cipmt, is then defined as 
 
 Cipmt = ൜1 if |vipmt|	≤	ε0 if |vipmt|	>	ε	,                              (2) 
 
                                                 
13 Using similar Finnish close elections data as we do, Kotakorpi, Poutvaara, and Terviö 
(2017) study returns to office and Hyytinen et al. (2017) study incumbency advantage and 
the performance of close elections RDD. Unlike these papers, we are interested in 
municipal level outcomes.  
14 Because vipmt cannot be defined for party lists where none of the candidates or all of the 
candidates get elected, approximately 4800 candidate-election observations are left out. 
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where ε is some small bandwidth, expressed in percentages (e.g., ε = 0.4 means “0.4%”; 
that is, 4 votes out of 1000). Due to randomness in the outcomes of elections, candidates 
just above and below the pivotal number do not differ systematically from each other. 
Indeed, when ε = 0 in our data, there was a tie within a party list between two (or more) 
candidates at the threshold of getting into the council. In such a case, a lottery decides 
which of the candidates are elected (see Hyytinen et al. 2017 for details). There are 1351 
candidates who end up in these lotteries and 335 of them are municipal employees.  
Step 2: Quasi-randomization taking place within each party list influences how many 
municipal employees get elected from each list. To capture this list-level variation, we 
calculate the difference between the realized outcome and the expected outcome of the 
close races within each party. Formally, this can expressed as 
 
 ௣ܶ௠௧= ቀ∑ ܥ௜௣௠௧ܦ௜௣௠௧ே೛௜ ܯ௜௣௠௧ቁ − ቈ
∑ ஼೔೛೘೟ಿ೛೔ ெ೔೛೘೟
∑ ஼೔೛೘೟ಿ೛೔
∑ ܥ௜௣௠௧ܦ௜௣௠௧ே೛௜ ቉,     (3) 
 
where Mipmt is equal to 1 if candidate i is a municipal employee and zero otherwise, Dipmt 
equals 1 if candidate i in municipality m was elected in election t and zero otherwise and p 
refers to a party list and Np to the number of candidates in the list p. The first term is the 
number of municipal employees that are elected in the close elections. The second term is 
the expected number of municipal employees who get elected in the close elections. The 
expected number comes from a hypergeometric distribution, because close elections can be 
seen as a basic urn problem.15 The reason for using Eq. (3) is that there may be more than 
two candidates that are close and thus subject to randomization and any number of the close 
                                                 
15 In an urn problem, the expected value is n(K/N) with and without replacement, where n is 
the number of available close seats, K the number of close municipal employees and N the 
number of close candidates. 
17 
 
 
candidates can be municipal employees.16 Moreover, the set of candidates defined as close 
may compete for more than one seat within the party list. These features are the main 
difference between our and Clots-Figueras’ (2011, 2012) approach, because she considers 
only situations where one male and one female candidate compete for one seat. 
Step 3: We aggregate the random variation at the party list-level to construct a 
municipal-level instrumental variable, Tmt. This is done by adding up Tpmt over all the party 
lists within a municipality and by dividing the sum by council size (CS): 
 
 Tmt =100*(∑ ௣ܶ௠௧)/ܥܵ௠௧௣ .                   (4) 
 
Our instrument, Tmt, captures the extent to which the seat share of municipal 
employees exceeds (Tmt > 0) or falls short of (Tmt < 0) their expected share due to 
randomness in the outcomes of the close elections. In other words, the instrument obtains 
higher values for those municipalities in which the municipal employee candidates were 
lucky and smaller values for those municipalities in which they were unlucky.  If, in a given 
municipality, municipal employees were lucky within one party list and equally unlucky in 
another, the instrument at the municipal-level would be zero. One can think of Tmt as the 
part of the variation in Mmt that is as-good-as random. Our IV approach thus assumes that 
Tmt is a determinant of Mmt, i.e., the (actual) seat share of municipal employees in the 
council and uncorrelated with umt in (1). This assumption can to an extent be tested using 
municipality-level covariate balance tests. Moreover, the candidate-level bandwidth can be 
used to check the robustness of the results to the bandwidth choice.  
                                                 
16 Simply “adding up” candidate level realized outcomes would not be appropriate. To see 
why, consider three municipal employees who are close and compete for one seat. In this 
case, a municipal employee is always elected. 
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Empirically, Tmt appears to work as expected (see Appendix B for details): First, it is 
symmetrically distributed around zero. Second, when the seat share of municipal 
employees increases due to randomness in the outcomes of the close elections (i.e., when 
Tmt increases by one unit), so does their actual share (i.e., Mmt). This implies that the 
coefficient of Tmt in the 1st stage of the IV should be close to one in a finite sample and 
equals unity asymptotically. This is indeed empirically the case in our data (Appendix B). 
This feature means that in the reduced form of our IV of equation (1), which means 
regressing the outcome directly on the instrument (and controls; Wooldridge 2002, ch. 5), 
the coefficient of the instrument ought to be very close to the IV estimate of δ. This 
observation is useful and in the subsequent section, we will report both the 2SLS and the 
reduced form of IV results.   
Finally, even with the smallest possible bandwidth (ε = 0), we have variation in Tmt. 
as explained above. As we increase the bandwidth, almost all municipalities in our data 
have a close contest within at least one party list. For example, for bandwidth ε = 0.4, we 
observe either a positive or a negative instrument in 1145 municipalities out of 1544. This 
does not imply that we would use for identification all the variation in the municipal 
employee council seat share in the data for these 1145 municipalities: To estimate δ, we 
only use the part of exogenous variation in Mmt that the instrument, Tmt, isolates.  
 
Validity Tests 
In Table 1, we report balance tests for pre-treatment covariates using the largest bandwidth 
that is employed in the regressions (ε = 0.4).17 We divide the data into two groups, based on 
                                                 
17 We face the standard trade-off that smaller bandwidths lead to less precise estimates: The 
narrower the bandwidth, the less there is variation in Tmt, but the more plausible the 
assumption of “as-good-as random assignment”. The results for the narrowest possible 
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the seat share of municipal employees exceeding (Tmt > 0) or falling short of (Tmt < 0) its 
expectation. Table 1 shows that the pre-treatment variables are well balanced, including the 
lagged total expenditures, the lagged municipal employee share in the council and its 
lagged instrument.18 This means that the municipalities where the municipal employees 
won, by chance, more seats are very similar to the municipalities where municipal 
employees lost, by chance, seats to other occupation groups. 
 
Table 1. Pre-treatment covariate balance at municipality-level. 
  Tmt > 0 Tmt < 0   
ε = 0.4 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 404 5 334 828 406 5 327 818 7 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 404 1 631 392 403 1 636 359 -5 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 404 3 703 679 403 3 691 654 12 
Population 588 17 488 46 681 557 13 548 33 128 3939 
Young inhabitants % 588 18.67 3.29 557 18.63 3.26 0.04 
Old inhabitants % 588 17.52 4.65 557 17.90 4.42 -0.38 
Council size 588 31.91 11.81 557 30.55 10.80 1.35 
Municipal employees % 404 28.38 13.49 403 27.69 12.99 0.70 
Municipal health care employees % 404 7.43 5.06 403 7.09 4.81 0.35 
Municipal non health care employees % 404 20.95 12.71 403 20.60 12.09 0.35 
Incumbents % 404 58.12 8.54 403 57.20 9.06 0.92 
Women % 404 33.69 9.02 403 33.12 8.45 0.57 
High professionals % 404 23.07 12.84 403 21.79 11.90 1.28 
University educated % 404 14.32 10.20 403 12.70 9.63 1.61 
Unemployed % 404 3.81 3.79 403 3.58 4.03 0.23 
 Notes: The statistical significance of the differences is tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the 
municipality-level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.  
 
                                                                                                                                                     
bandwidth (ε = 0) and party affiliation balance tests echo the results reported in Table 1 
(see Appendix B). 
18 The number of observations varies because some of the pre-treatment variables for the 
1996 election term are not available. 
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Table 2 reports balance tests on council characteristics for the current election term.19 
As Panel A shows, the post-treatment council characteristics are well balanced. For 
example, the municipal employees that by chance won a seat from a candidate from another 
occupation are of no better or worse quality (see Ferreira and Gyourko 2014 who argue that 
e.g. gender discrimination would imply that candidates with the same number of votes 
would be of different quality), as measured by their incumbency and education. The only 
exception to the good balance is the councils’ gender composition. This finding mirrors the 
strong positive correlation in the data between gender and occupation status at the 
candidate-level.20 The imbalance is not a result of failed randomization, but rather an 
intrinsic feature of municipal employees: When a municipal employee is randomly 
allocated into a council, a female is more likely to get a seat in the council.  
In Panels B and C of Table 2, we divide municipal employees into two categories: 
those who work in the health care sector and those who work in the remaining (non-health 
care) sectors.21 The division allows us to analyze whether the positive correlation between 
municipal employment status and gender is driven by the health care sector and, in 
particular, by nursing being a female-dominated occupation. Panel B and C of Table 2 
suggest that, indeed, the gender imbalance is related to the health care sector. We return to 
the importance of gender for our findings below.  
  
                                                 
19 The post-treatment seat shares are by definition balanced, because our instrument is 
based on within party close contests (see Appendix B). 
20 Municipal employees are more often female and have higher socioeconomic status than 
the candidates that have other employment status (see Table A1 in Appendix A). 
21 We do not disaggregate the latter group into more specific categories, because the data 
get sparse: First, candidates at finer level occupations are involved in close elections 
infrequently; second, detailed sector specific spending data are not always available; and 
third, most occupational groups are small overall (e.g., even education employees have only 
3.5% seat share on average). 
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Table 2. Post-treatment council covariate balance.  
ε = 0.4 Tmt > 0 Tmt < 0   
Panel A: All municipal employees N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference
Incumbents % 588 57.26 9.16 557 57.29 8.85 -0.04 
Female % 588 34.72 8.76 557 33.18 8.40 1.54** 
High professionals % 588 23.34 12.84 557 22.06 11.83 1.27 
University educated % 588 14.57 10.72 557 13.47 10.07 1.11 
Unemployed % 588 3.47 3.88 557 3.43 3.99 0.04 
Panel B: Municipal health care employees N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference
Incumbents % 305 57.58 8.83 319 58.13 8.88 -0.55 
Women % 305 35.86 7.69 319 33.86 8.53 2.00** 
High professionals % 305 25.47 13.47 319 24.11 12.47 1.36 
University educated % 305 16.35 11.44 319 15.38 10.74 0.98 
Unemployed % 305 3.16 3.43 319 3.22 3.88 -0.06 
Panel C: Municipal non-health employees N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference
Incumbents % 522 57.25 9.09 496 57.48 8.95 -0.24 
Women % 522 34.45 8.84 496 33.62 8.47 0.83 
High professionals % 522 24.02 12.80 496 22.66 12.43 1.36 
University educated % 522 14.67 10.79 496 14.03 10.59 0.64 
Unemployed % 522 3.61 3.93 496 3.35 3.87 0.26 
Notes: In Panel A, the treatment groups are based on all municipal employees. In Panel B, the groups are 
based on health care sector employees. In Panel C, the groups are based on those municipal employees who 
do not work in the health care sector. The statistical significance of the differences is tested using a t-test 
adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 
10 % level, respectively.  
 
Results 
Treatment Effect on Total Expenditures 
We start by analyzing the effect of the share of municipal employees in the council on the 
(log) per capita total expenditures of the local government, measured as the average over 
the four year council term.  
Preliminary regression results: To have a point of comparison, we report naïve 
OLS results with different sets of controls (Panel A of Table 3) along with the IV results 
(Panel B of Table 3) and the reduced form of IV (Panel C of Table 3), using the narrowest 
possible bandwidth of ε = 0. The OLS estimations obviously do not correct for the potential 
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endogeneity of the seat share of the municipal employees, while the latter two ought to do 
that. The difference between the four columns of each panel is that they include 
successively more controls. We use lags (means over the t–1 election term) of the control 
variables to avoid the possible problem of introducing bad controls (i.e. alternative 
outcomes) in the models.  
As the first three columns of Panel A of Table 3 show, the OLS estimations suggest a 
positive and statistically significant association between the political representation of 
public employees and total expenditures. This association vanishes completely once we 
include a second order polynomial of the vote share of municipal employees (see column 
4). This is not unexpected, because the municipal employees’ vote and seat shares are 
highly correlated. While insignificant, the point estimates from the IV (Panel B) and the 
reduced form of IV (Panel C) estimations provide us with three important empirical 
insights: First, the IV point estimates are positive and larger in magnitude than the OLS 
estimates. Second, if our instrument is as-good-as random, the only implication of having 
more control variables in the model ought to be that they reduce residual variance. The 
results reported in Panel B and C bear this out: The magnitudes of the IV estimates do not 
change (much) when the municipal employee vote share is controlled for. This finding 
indicates that unlike OLS, the IV estimates are not confounded by voter preferences. 
Moreover, the standard errors of the estimates tend to get smaller when more controls are 
added. Third, the results reported in Panel B and C suggest that the limited amount of 
variation in the instrument is a potential problem with using the narrowest possible 
bandwidth (ε = 0). If so, the first-stage regressions may suffer from low power, especially 
when fewer controls are included. This is indeed what we observe: The first stage F-tests 
become larger when we control for the municipal employee vote share (see column (8)).  
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Table 3. Results for total expenditures: OLS and IV analysis with ε = 0. 
Panel A: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Municipal employees 0.0016*** 0.0021*** 0.0018*** -0.0003 
[0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0007] 
R2 0.29 0.43 0.58 0.58 
Panel B: IV, ε = 0 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Municipal employees 
 
0.0058 0.0046 0.0070 0.0048 
[0.0110] [0.0103] [0.0087] [0.0042] 
First stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 2.01 1.98 2.44 35.23 
Panel C: Reduced form of IV, ε = 0 (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Municipal employees 
 
0.0024 0.0019 0.0031 0.0041 
[0.0047] [0.0042] [0.0036] [0.0036] 
R2 0.29 0.42 0.57 0.58 
N 1544 1544 1544 1544 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Party controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls No No Yes Yes 
Vote share No No No Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of the mean of per capita total expenditures over the council term. Standard errors are clustered at 
the municipality level and reported in brackets. Party controls include parties’ lagged seat shares. 
Municipality controls include lagged population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens. 
Vote share includes a second order polynomial of the municipal employees’ vote share. ***, ** and * denote 
1, 5 and 10 % statistical significance levels respectively. 
 
Main regression results: To explore whether we can estimate the effect of political 
representation of municipal employees on municipal expenditures more precisely, we use 
the wider bandwidth of ε = 0.4. The wider bandwidth allows us to bring in more variation 
from the close elections. These results are reported in Table 4, where Panel A reports our 
IV estimates and Panel B our reduced form estimates. The estimations that rely on the 
wider bandwidths can be taken to be more reliable if they produce a point estimate that is 
similar in magnitude to that produced by the narrowest bandwidth and if the effect can be 
estimated with greater precision (smaller standard error).  
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Table 4. Results for total expenditures: IV analysis with ε = 0.4. 
Panel A: IV, ε = 0.4 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Municipal employees 
 
0.0034* 0.0046*** 0.0040*** 0.0041*** 
[0.0018] [0.0017] [0.0015] [0.0016]    
First stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 56.79 59.91 59.65 288.9 
Panel B: Reduced form of IV, ε = 0.4 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Municipal employees 
 
0.0032* 0.0043*** 0.0037*** 0.0036*** 
[0.0017] [0.0016] [0.0014] [0.0014]    
R2 0.29 0.42 0.57 0.58 
N 1544 1544 1544 1544 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Party controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls No No Yes Yes 
Vote share No No No Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of the mean of per capita total expenditures over the council term. Standard errors are clustered at 
the municipality level and reported in brackets. Party controls include parties’ lagged seat shares. 
Municipality controls include lagged population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens. 
Vote share includes a second order polynomial of the municipal employees’ vote share. ***, ** and * denote 
1, 5 and 10 % statistical significance levels respectively. 
 
Starting from the IV estimates in Panel A of Table 4, we find across all specifications 
a statistically significant treatment effect of 0.0034-0.0046 on municipal spending from 
having a larger share of municipal employees in the council. The reduced form results in 
Panel B echo the IV findings: They yield treatment effect estimates that are statistically 
significant and very similar to those obtained with IV, but somewhat smaller in magnitude. 
It is especially noteworthy that both estimators deliver point estimates that are very close to 
those we obtained using the narrowest possible bandwidth (ε = 0.0; see Panel B in Table 3). 
The fact that the reduced form estimates are a little smaller in absolute value than the IV 
estimates suggests that the first stage coefficient of the instrument is close to, but somewhat 
smaller than, one (as it often is; see Appendix B). It is comforting to report that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the 1st stage coefficient of the instrument is unity. 
The point estimates of Table 4 show that, consistent with our Hypothesis 1, the 
council seat share of municipal employees causally increases municipal spending. 
Increasing municipal employees’ seat share by 1 percentage point increases per capita total 
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expenditures annually by circa 0.4 % over one election term. As one seat is on average 3 
percentage points of the total number of seats, the overall average effect of an increase of 
one seat is roughly (at least) 1%. Because the average annual municipal spending is around 
5600 Euros per capita, this effect translates into around 60 euros per capita. The effect is 
surprisingly large taking three features into account: First, we are identifying the effect at a 
potentially unimportant of margin of allocating the last seats to the council. Second, the 
non-elected marginal candidates, to which the elected ones are compared, are often vice-
councilors. Our estimate is conservative, because vice-councilors get to attend council 
meetings if the councilor is absent, may get a council seat if elected councilors step down 
during the term, and are sometimes given positions in the municipal sub-committees. Third, 
there are non-negligible institutional restrictions on the political representation of the 
municipal employees. The effect could have been larger, had there not been no such rules in 
place. While a detailed comparison is not straightforward, the magnitude of the effect is 
nevertheless quite comparable to those reported in the prior papers using data from similar 
countries and identification based on marginal seats (Freier and Odendahl 2015; Fiva and 
Halse 2016; Fiva, Folke, and Sørensen 2017). 
Robustness checks: We have explored the robustness of our main findings and their 
internal and external validity in a number of ways (see Appendix B). 
First, electing public employees has the documented spending effect irrespectively of 
their attributes (e.g. gender, age, education). However, a consequence of electing a public 
employee is greater female participation in the council. This increase may in itself increase 
public spending (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Clots-Figueras 2011; Svaleryd 2009; 
Braendle and Colombier 2016). We therefore explore whether the council seat share of 
municipal employees increases municipal spending also when the gender composition of 
the marginal seats, i.e., the seat share of females, is accounted for. We instrument this 
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potentially endogenous share by the share of females who were randomly elected in the 
close contests. This instrument is calculated using the same procedure that produced the 
instrument for the share of municipal employees. When female seat share is included in the 
model, we get at the effect of electing a municipal employee while keeping the gender 
composition of the council constant. Adding the seat share of females to the estimations of 
Table 4 has only a minor impact on our results, suggesting that there is a municipal 
employee effect on spending independent of gender: For example, the IV estimates are still 
statistically significant and vary from 0.0032 to 0.0035.  
Second, the choice of bandwidth ε = 0.4 for our main analysis is somewhat ad hoc. 
The point estimates of the municipal employee effect are quite stable across a wide range of 
bandwidths and statistically significant for the bandwidths from ε = 0.24 upwards.  
Third, we have analyzed the expenditure effects separately for each year instead of 
the mean over the whole council term. These by-year estimates are all significant, similar in 
magnitude to what we reported earlier and stable over the council term (no within-term 
trend). We have also run by-year placebo regressions (four years prior to the council term 
of interest), and the estimates are insignificant as they should. However, the expenditure 
effect is somewhat persistent, as it is different from zero and significant for two years after 
the council term ends. The effect becomes insignificant by the third post-term year.  
Fourth, we have also constructed the instrument using placebo thresholds of getting 
elected within the party lists. Reassuringly, neither the first nor the second stage IV 
estimates are significantly different from zero when we use the placebo thresholds.  
Finally, our main results are based on the entire sample of 1544 municipality-election 
period observations, even though the instrument can be different from zero only within the 
chosen bandwidth. This choice may lead to a selection bias if the municipalities implicitly 
selected by the bandwidth are different from the rest of the municipalities. For example, in 
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the close sample defined by the choice of bandwidth of ε = 0, the covariates balance 
perfectly. On the other hand, for ε = 0.4, the close sample is different from the other 
municipalities, because larger municipalities are selected into the close sample.22 However, 
it is unlikely that this selection compromises the validity of our findings, because our point 
estimates are robust to changing the bandwidth. We have also replicated the results of Table 
4 using only those observations in which close elections take place: The point estimates 
remain unchanged, standard errors are slightly larger, but the estimates are mostly 
statistically significant nonetheless. 
 
Mechanisms at Work 
Our results show that when elected, municipal employees influence per capita local public 
spending (Hypothesis 1). We now turn to our Hypothesis 2a and test whether the influence 
of an additional municipal employee depends on council size. In the two leftmost columns 
of Table 5, we present the results for which we have divided the sample into two based on 
the median council size (27 councilors). Consistent with Hypothesis 2a, we find that the 
effect is larger and significant in the municipalities with a smaller council size. The 
difference between the smaller and larger councils is also statistically significant.23  
We then test Hypothesis 2b and specifically the possibility that the municipal 
employees have a disproportionate effect within and via their party. Table 5 reports results 
                                                 
22 The reason for this is that we define the bandwidth within parties in vote shares. This 
means that even the bandwidth of 0.4 (4 votes out of 1000) is very narrow. For example, a 
party list needs get more than 500 votes for a candidate with a two vote distance to the 
threshold to be within the bandwidth. Larger municipalities have such narrow bandwidths 
more often.  
23 The effect for the larger councils is not significantly different from zero. This does not 
imply that municipal employees could not affect spending in some types of larger councils, 
but studying such heterogeneity in detail would call for larger datasets and an alternative 
identification strategy.  
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for the largest and second largest parties. Unlike in our earlier regressions, here the 
endogenous explanatory variable and the instrument refer to the shares of municipal 
employees within the respective party, not in the entire council. We find a significant effect 
for the largest party, whereas the estimates are smaller and insignificant for the second 
largest party (see also Appendix C). However, the effects are not statistically significantly 
different from each other. Thus, while not conclusive, the evidence is consistent with 
Hypothesis 2b.24 This result suggests that municipal employees may be a non-partisan 
interest group that is able to influence decision making especially within the party. If the 
party is large, they have a disproportionate effect on policy.25 
  
                                                 
24 We should note that the Centre Party is most often the largest party in the Finnish 
municipalities, due to its considerable support in the smaller rural municipalities (which 
constitute the bulk of municipalities). Therefore, the effect captured in Table 5 may be a 
Centre Party phenomenon rather than a more general party size effect.  
25 We have also considered a number of other explanations. First, the marginally elected 
municipal employees do not lead to municipal employees having a majority in the council 
or to their party becoming dominated by municipal employees: Such instances are very rare 
in the data. Second, the effect is not larger in the municipalities where the marginally 
elected councilor was the only elected municipal employee from his/her party (not 
reported). Moreover, instances where there would be only one municipal employee in the 
entire council are very rare in the data. Finally, the increase in the municipal employee 
representation apparently does not increase the probability that a political leader (chairman 
of the council board or chairman of the council) would be a municipal employee. 
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Table 5. Heterogeneity in the total expenditures effect by council and party size. 
  Council size ≤ 27 
Council 
size > 27 
Largest 
party 
2nd largest 
party 
Panel A: IV, ε = 0.4 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Municipal employees 0.0066*** 0.00003 0.0048**  0.0016 
[0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0020]   [0.0031] 
First stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 27.81 27.69 75.22 38.95 
Panel B: Reduced form of IV, ε = 0.4 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Municipal employees 
 
0.0051*** 0.00003 0.0049**  0.0016 
[0.0016] [0.0024] [0.0020]   [0.0032] 
R2 0.59 0.60 0.56 0.57 
N 1017 527 1469 1235 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Party and municipality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of the mean of per capita total expenditures over the council term. Standard errors are clustered at 
the municipality level and reported in brackets. Party controls include parties’ lagged seat shares. 
Municipality controls include lagged population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens. 
***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 % statistical significance levels respectively. 
 
Evidence on Rent-Seeking 
To shed light on whether the effect of public employee representation on public spending 
reflects rent-seeking, or whether it is more consistent with efficient provision of public 
services, we test Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b.  
To start with, we explore whether the link between municipal employees in the 
council and municipal spending is occupation specific. It is plausible that municipal 
employees have more information on their own employment sector. However, there is no 
reason why, for example, a teacher would have better information about the appropriate 
level of health care spending than an otherwise similar councilor from the private sector. In 
columns (1) and (3) of Table 6, the outcome variable is municipal expenditures that are not 
related to health care, whereas in columns (2) and (4) of the panels the outcome variable is 
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health care expenditures.26 In these models, the interpretation for the coefficient for 
municipal health care employees is that it mirrors the effect of increasing their seat share 
relative to any non-municipal employee occupation.27  
The results suggest that health care municipal employees increase health care 
expenditures, but non-health care municipal employees have no effect on them. Similarly, 
health care employees do not affect non-health care expenditures, but municipal employees 
in the sectors other than health increase the other (non-health) municipal expenditures. 
Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 3a, spending increases seem to be confined to the sectors 
that have, by chance, more representation through municipal employees in the municipal 
council.28  
While not entirely conclusive, the evidence is consistent with the information 
advantage of municipal employees (Niskanen 1971; Romer and Rosenthal 1979). Of 
course, one has to bear in mind that the context of those models is somewhat different from 
ours as these models focus on how bureaucrats can convince politicians to overspend. 
Moreover, the evidence speaks − at least mildly − for inefficient spending, because our as-
good-as-random instrument ensures that variation in the needs of citizens is not driving the 
results. This raises the obvious question of why municipal employees’ information 
advantage leads to increased − and not to decreased − spending and only in their own sector 
of employment. These results also speak against the interpretation that municipal 
                                                 
26 When there are more than one endogenous variable, we report the Angrist-Pischke first-
stage F-statistics of individual endogenous regressor produced by the ivreg2 STATA 
command. 
27 The results for pre-treatment covariate balance tests and the first stage estimations of the 
IV suggest that the instrument works as expected (Appendix D).  
28 The effects are not statistically significantly different from each other. These results are 
similar also if we run the analysis by party size or if we add the seat share of females to the 
models (see Appendix D). The results for the non-health care expenditures are also robust 
to using other bandwidth choices. However, the effect of the seat share of municipal health 
care employees on health spending is less robust in this regard. 
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employees increase spending because they generally prefer a larger public sector (Knutsen 
2005; Jensen, Sum, and Flynn 2009; Rattsø and Sørensen 2016). Finally, we would like to 
point out that intra-party bargaining − for which we already provided support earlier − is an 
example of an indirect mechanism that could generate the observed sector specific effects: 
Given that councilors with municipal employment cannot be members of the sub-
committee of their own sector, they have to influence sector-specific spending indirectly.  
 
Table 6. Results according to occupation and spending category. 
  Outcome: non health care expenditures 
Outcome: health care 
expenditures 
Panel A: IV, ε = 0.4 (1) (2) 
Municipal non health care employees 0.0043** 0.0016 
  [0.0021] [0.0036]    
First stage Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 30.09 30.09 
Municipal health care employees 0.0045 0.0081**  
  [0.0033] [0.0039]    
First stage Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 33.88 33.88 
Panel B: Reduced form of IV, ε = 0.4 (3) (4) 
Municipal non health care employees 
  
0.0043** 0.0019 
[0.0021] [0.0035]    
Municipal health care employees 
  
0.0036 0.0076**  
[0.0030] [0.0036]    
R2 0.43 0.18 
N 1534 1534 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Party and municipality controls Yes Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variables are the 
logarithms of the means of per capita expenditures over the council term. Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level and reported in brackets. Party controls include parties’ lagged seat shares. Municipality 
controls include lagged population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens. ***, ** and * 
denote 1, 5 and 10 % statistical significance levels respectively. 
 
The results reported so far are consistent with our Hypothesis 3a, i.e., with municipal 
employees having an information advantage over politicians and being able to convince 
politicians to spend more on public services. To test Hypothesis 3b, which postulates that 
the extra spending is excessive and related to rent-seeking, we analyze whether municipal 
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employees enjoy larger returns to office in terms of receiving larger salary increases and/or 
facing smaller unemployment risk, and whether they enjoy from a larger incumbency 
advantage than the other candidates. When we use candidate-level data (either lottery 
outcomes that make the election status truly random or RDD), we find no systematic 
evidence that that the municipal employees would get higher salaries, be more likely to be 
employed subsequently, or that they would be more likely to get re-elected or get more 
votes (in the next election at t + 1) than the other candidates due to getting elected at time t 
(see the Appendix E for details of these results).29  
These null results do not support Hypothesis 3b. Using auxiliary survey data from the 
Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE), we have, however, confirmed that municipal 
employees who run for a council differ from the other candidates in two intriguing ways: 
Firstly, they oppose more strongly firing of municipal employees in connection with 
municipal mergers. Secondly, they oppose more strongly restrictions on nomination of 
municipal employees in municipal boards (see Appendix E for details and further media 
references). One could argue that these stated views, as well as the concerns expressed in 
the Finnish media, are harder to reconcile with pro-social behavior than with rent-seeking.  
 
Conclusions 
We have produced three novel findings in this paper. First, the political representation of 
municipal employees has a positive causal effect on overall local public spending. Second, 
the effect is sector specific: Having more health care sector employees in the council 
                                                 
29 We have also analyzed whether the political representation of municipal employees 
shows up in house prices, because high levels of government rent extraction might be 
capitalized in them (Gyourko and Tracy 1991). Using municipal-level data on real estate 
transactions, we find no effect on house prices. 
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increases health care spending and having more non-health sector employees increases non-
health care spending, but there are no significant cross-sector effects. Third, the effect 
appears to be related to the interest group influencing the policy from within the parties.  
Our findings hold two lessons for contemporary research in political economics and 
political science. The first is that politicians’ identities matter in local political decision 
making characterized by proportional representation and open-list D’Hondt election rule. 
The citizen-candidate model (Osborne and Slivinski 1996; Besley and Coate 1997) is 
therefore more in line with our evidence than the median voter model or Tiebout (1956) 
competition. The second lesson is that the marginally elected candidates are able to 
influence local policy. This influence may explain why in the very same Finnish elections 
that we have studied in this paper, a greater likelihood of being the pivotal voter increases 
turnout (Lyytikäinen and Tukiainen 2016).  
It is important to interpret our results in the context to which they apply. Our findings 
refer to a country that has a large public sector and that has traditionally given the local 
municipalities a major role in the allocation of public resources and production of public 
services. While we do not find systematic evidence of rent-seeking, our results show that 
the Finnish municipal councilors employed by the public sector want − by revealed 
preference − to increase public expenditures in a country that in 2014 had the highest public 
sector ratio to GDP and whose local governments were among the most indebted among all 
OECD countries. This is puzzling because our as-good-as-random design guarantees that 
the citizens’ needs are identical on average in the analyzed municipalities across all sectors. 
One can therefore raise the question why, in this context, would informed and benevolent 
municipal employee councilors increase rather than decrease their own sector’s public 
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spending? Moreover, can it be desirable − in this context and more generally − that 
municipal spending is strongly affected by one particular interest group? 
Making precise statements about the external validity of a close elections analysis is 
challenging. On one hand, there are about 40 countries in the world using an open-list PR, 
similar in spirit to what we have studied. Moreover, the Finnish rules governing the 
political representation of municipal employees have the same broad goal as many other 
countries’ corresponding rules: They have been written in order to prevent public 
employees from having undue influence on political decision-making. It thus seems 
possible that our results generalize at least to countries with a similar political system at the 
local level. On the other hand, details of political processes tend to matter: We should not 
extrapolate too much, as there is quite a bit cross-country variation in both the precise 
functioning of the open-list PR systems as well as in the design of ineligibility and 
incompatibility rules (Braendle and Stutzer 2016).  
Rather than offering detailed policy recommendations, we conclude with a call for 
more research. There are three reasons to this call. First, while our findings support the 
argument that some regulation of public employees’ political involvement is warranted, 
they do not provide guidance on the optimal design of ineligibility and incompatibility 
rules. We can only conjecture how large the estimated effect would have been, had there 
not been any restrictions on political participation of public sector employees in Finland. 
Moreover, we would need to understand better what the interests of other groups are to 
optimally design policy. Second, when, how and why ineligibility and incompatibility rules 
prevent public employees from having undue influence on political decision-making in 
general and spending in particular is likely to be context dependent. This calls for 
replicating our analysis in other institutional contexts. Finally, the empirical procedure 
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presented here can be applied to a wider range of electoral systems than just the open-list 
PR. For example, one can use similar aggregation of close races to look at effects of council 
composition in plurality systems, where the council is composed of politicians elected from 
many (single or multi-member) districts. Subsequent work can thus make use of our 
procedure to provide more analyses of the desirability to restrict public employees’ political 
participation in different environments.  
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Online Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table A1. This table reports the descriptive statistics on the candidates in elections held between 1996 and 
2008. These data are used to construct, e.g., the instrument and some control variables. To illustrate the 
differences between municipal employee and other candidates, we also split the sample in two by municipal 
employee status. Overall we have 161,263 candidate-election observations. The final candidate sample size 
is 152,987 as we omit 33 elections, because those municipalities underwent a merger during the election 
term. We also omit 2004 data for two merging municipalities due to ambiguities in the candidate-level 
election data. It seems that the ambiguity results from a popular candidate being disqualified. In Table A1, 
5% of the municipal employees are classified as unemployed due to differences in survey timing and 
definitions between Statistics Finland unemployment status and our municipal employee status. 
 
Table A1. Candidate characteristics. 
  All Municipal employees Other 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev.
Vote share 152 987 1.01 1.21 35 491 1.11 1.28 117 496 0.98 1.18 
Party vote share 152 987 6.05 11.28 35 491 6.19 10.53 117 496 6.01 11.49 
Number of votes 152 987 59.29 149.33 35 491 68.81 152.36 117 496 56.42 148.28 
Female 152 987 0.39 0.49 35 491 0.56 0.50 117 496 0.34 0.47 
Age 152 987 46.23 12.30 35 491 45.12 10.49 117 496 46.57 12.78 
Incumbent 152 987 0.21 0.41 35 491 0.25 0.43 117 496 0.20 0.40 
Wage income (€) 134 034 22 895 25 572 30 964 24 355 14 941 103 070 22 457 27 973 
Capital income (€) 134 034 2 408 30 933 30 964 1 025 8 431 103 070 2 823 34 960 
High professional 152 913 0.20 0.40 35 482 0.31 0.46 117 431 0.16 0.37 
Unemployed 152 913 0.07 0.25 35 482 0.05 0.22 117 431 0.07 0.26 
University degree 120 922 0.15 0.36 30 790 0.18 0.38 90 132 0.14 0.35 
Coalition Party 152 987 0.19 0.39 35 491 0.17 0.37 117 496 0.19 0.40 
Social Dem. Party 152 987 0.22 0.41 35 491 0.27 0.44 117 496 0.20 0.40 
Center Party 152 987 0.28 0.45 35 491 0.26 0.44 117 496 0.28 0.45 
True Finns 152 987 0.03 0.17 35 491 0.02 0.12 117 496 0.03 0.18 
Green Party 152 987 0.04 0.20 35 491 0.05 0.22 117 496 0.04 0.20 
Left Alliance 152 987 0.11 0.31 35 491 0.11 0.31 117 496 0.11 0.31 
Swedish Party 152 987 0.04 0.19 35 491 0.04 0.19 117 496 0.04 0.19 
Christian Dem. Party 152 987 0.04 0.20 35 491 0.04 0.20 117 496 0.04 0.21 
Other parties 152 987 0.05 0.22 35 491 0.04 0.20 117 496 0.06 0.23 
Notes: Income and education data are missing for some observations for all election years. More importantly, for the 1996 
elections, income data are available only for the candidates who run also in 2000, 2004 or 2008 elections. We use 1995 occupation 
data for the elections held in 1996. 
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Table A2. This table reports the descriptive statistics at the municipality level, including both municipality 
and local council characteristics. 
 
Table A2. Summary statistics for municipal and council data. 
Variable Mean Std. dev. 
Municipality characteristics     
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 5,564 999 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 1,699 409 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 3,865 822 
Population 12,912 36,999 
Young inhabitants % 17.7 3.52 
Old inhabitants % 19.5 4.90 
Council composition     
Council size 29.1 11.3 
Municipal employees % 26.4 12.3 
Municipal health care workers % 7.02 5.11 
Municipal non health care workers % 19.40 11.43 
Incumbents % 56.9 9.22 
Women % 33.9 8.93 
High professionals % 20.9 11.9 
University educated % 12.6 9.9 
Unemployed % 3.54 4.02 
Center Party seat share % 40.5 21.2 
Coalition Party seat share % 16.3 10.9 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 19.6 11.3 
Green party seat share % 1.88 3.52 
Left Alliance seat share % 7.82 8.01 
Swedish Party seat share % 5.33 18.1 
True Finns seat share % 1.75 4.13 
Christian Democrats seat share % 2.99 3.94 
Other parties seat share % 3.87 9.05 
Notes: Unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. Number of observations is 1544. Municipality characteristics 
are calculated as means over the four year council term. Young inhabitants refer to the age group of 0-17 year old and old to 64+ 
year old.  
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Online Appendix B: Robustness and Validity of the Total Expenditures Effect  
 
Figures B1 and B2. These figures illustrate that the variation in the instrument increases as the bandwidth 
increases. The shape of the distribution remains symmetric, implying valid randomization. 
 
 
Figure B1. Distribution of mtT . 
 
Figure B2. Distribution of mtT (excluding zeros). 
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Figure B3. We use this figure to explore whether our aggregation procedure produces a correct municipality 
level instrument. We can do so by running the first stage of IV and checking whether the coefficient of the 
instrument Tm (?) is indeed one. This regression can also be used to test for the power of our instrument for 
various bandwidth sizes. In Figure B3, we present estimates of ? for various bandwidths (ε), first controlling 
only for the year fixed effect (the figure on the left) and then for all the municipality controls (the figure on 
the right). As can be seen, the coefficient is below unity when the instrument is calculated using only the 
lotteries in the data (i.e., those ties that are actually solved using a lottery), though we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that it is unity. However, when using larger bandwidths the point estimate is close to unity, as it 
should be. The anomaly in the “lottery sample” may simply be a small sample statistical fluke: In particular, 
the first stages for the instruments for health care employees or females do not contain this anomaly (see 
Figures D1 and F1).  
The first stage is fairly precisely estimated for bandwidths larger than 0.04 (i.e., 4 votes out of ten 
thousand). The control variables do not increase precision substantially. The “lottery sample” (ε = 0) 
produces noisier results, but the precision increases as we increase the bandwidth. For a bandwidth of 0.04 
the F-test statistics for the instrument is around 10 and for the larger bandwidths it is substantially larger 
than 10 (e.g. for the 0.4 bandwidth with the controls, the F-test statistic is 60). From the perspective of 
statistical power, we should rely on the results that use bandwidths of about 0.08 or larger. 
 
  
Figure B3. First stage of IV for municipal employees. 
Notes: The solid line represents the first stage point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence interval. The left hand 
graph includes only the year dummies as controls. The right hand graph includes year dummies, parties' lagged seat shares, 
municipality population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens (all lagged). Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. 
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Table B1. This table shows the pre-treatment covariate balance. We divide the data into two groups, based 
on the seat share of municipal employees exceeding (Tmt > 0) or falling short of (Tmt < 0) its expectation and 
test whether the difference in means is statistically significant. To this end, we employ a simple t-test, 
adjusting for clustering at the municipality level. The number of observations varies because we do not 
observe some of the pre-treatment variables for the 1996 election term. For example, we do not have the 
1992 individual level election data. Furthermore, due to a structural data break in 1997, we do not have 
comparable expenditure measures for 1993–1996. Only in one case out of 48, we find one difference being 
statistically significant at 10 % level. Therefore, this table provides support for our instrument capturing 
truly random variation.  
We also test covariate balance using regression that controls for year fixed effects (not reported). 
When ε = 0.4, the null hypothesis of balance is rejected only for two variables (Coalition Party seat share 
and Council size) at the 5% significance level. Due to multiple testing, this cannot be taken as a sign of 
imbalance: the number of rejections is no more than would be expected at the chosen level of significance. 
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Table B1. Pre-treatment covariate balance at municipality-level.  
  Tmt > 0 Tmt < 0   
ε = 0 (lotteries) N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 68 5 316 956 75 5 323 838 -7 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 68 1 600 352 75 1 653 370 -53 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 68 3 716 795 75 3 670 663 46 
Population 109 8 524 14 144 118 8 835 11 398 -311 
Young inhabitants % 109 18.83 3.67 118 18.67 3.04 0.16 
Old inhabitants % 109 18.05 4.61 118 18.02 4.61 0.03 
Council size 109 27.75 9.32 118 27.88 10.05 -1.17 
Municipal employees % 68 28.69 14.07 75 27.75 11.50 0.93 
Instrument for municipal employees 68 0.00 0.08 75 -0.08 0.08 0.08 
Municipal health care employees % 68 7.72 5.50 75 7.50 4.49 0.22 
Municipal non-health care employees % 68 20.97 12.11 75 20.25 10.69 0.72 
Incumbents % 68 56.65 7.57 75 57.11 9.40 -3.76 
Women % 68 34.02 9.63 75 34.08 8.36 -0.06 
High professionals % 68 18.73 11.42 75 19.56 10.11 -0.83 
University educated % 68 11.65 7.43 75 10.57 7.62 1.08 
Unemployed % 68 2.81 3.21 75 3.98 4.48 -1.17* 
Center Party seat share % 109 40.49 20.08 118 40.53 19.50 -0.03 
Coalition Party seat share % 109 16.13 9.63 118 16.07 10.17 0.06 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 109 19.97 10.92 118 21.30 10.73 -1.33 
Green party seat share % 109 1.89 3.22 118 1.53 3.43 0.36 
Left Alliance seat share % 109 9.49 8.83 118 8.90 8.76 0.59 
Swedish Party seat share % 109 3.25 13.82 118 3.79 15.75 -0.54 
True Finns seat share % 109 2.33 4.70 118 2.11 4.08 0.22 
Christian Democrats seat share % 109 3.01 3.89 118 2.73 3.62 0.28 
ε = 0.4 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 404 5 334 828 406 5 327 818 7 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 404 1 631 392 403 1 636 359 -5 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 404 3 703 679 403 3 691 654 12 
Population 588 17 488 46 681 557 13 548 33 128 3 939 
Young inhabitants % 588 18.67 3.29 557 18.63 3.26 0.04 
Old inhabitants % 588 17.52 4.65 557 17.90 4.42 -0.38 
Council size 588 31.91 11.81 557 30.55 10.80 1.35 
Municipal employees % 404 28.38 13.49 403 27.69 12.99 0.70 
Instrument for municipal employees 404 0.17 0.10 404 0.02 0.10 0.15 
Municipal health care employees % 404 7.43 5.06 403 7.09 4.81 0.35 
Municipal non-health care employees % 404 20.95 12.71 403 20.60 12.09 0.35 
Incumbents % 404 58.12 8.54 403 57.20 9.06 0.92 
Women % 404 33.69 9.02 403 33.12 8.45 0.57 
High professionals % 404 23.07 12.84 403 21.79 11.90 1.28 
University educated % 404 14.32 10.20 403 12.70 9.63 1.61 
Unemployed % 404 3.81 3.79 403 3.58 4.03 0.23 
Center Party seat share % 588 36.83 21.08 557 37.95 21.26 -1.11 
Coalition Party seat share % 588 17.15 10.07 557 15.94 10.15 1.21 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 588 21.70 11.83 557 21.55 11.56 0.15 
Green party seat share % 588 2.40 3.94 557 1.92 3.52 0.48 
Left Alliance seat share % 588 9.19 8.64 557 8.85 8.39 0.34 
Swedish Party seat share % 588 4.54 16.16 557 5.70 18.47 -1.16 
True Finns seat share % 588 1.84 3.92 557 1.63 3.77 0.20 
Christian Democrats seat share % 588 3.04 3.65 557 3.08 3.61 -0.04 
Notes: The statistical significance of the differences is tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the municipality-level. ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.  
 
Table B2. This table shows the post-treatment covariate balance. The means are mostly balanced between 
the two groups. However, it should be noted that women’s seat share is significantly larger in municipalities 
with a positive instrument. As we argue in the main text, this is not due to failed randomization but rather to 
the fact that most municipal employees are women (see also Table A1). 
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Table B2. Post-treatment council covariate balance for all municipal employees. 
  Tmt > 0 Tmt < 0   
ε = 0 (lotteries) N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference
Incumbents % 109 55.77 8.82 118 56.31 9.96 -0.54 
Women % 109 33.55 8.59 118 32.42 8.96 1.14 
High professionals % 109 20.29 10.63 118 20.58 10.43 -0.29 
University educated % 109 12.07 8.13 118 11.42 8.53 0.65 
Unemployed % 109 3.71 4.48 118 3.87 4.36 -0.16 
Center Party % 109 42.55 19.84 118 41.07 19.31 1.48 
Coalition Party % 109 17.10 9.59 118 17.75 10.84 -0.64 
Social Democratic Party % 109 18.06 9.62 118 19.71 10.83 -1.65 
Green party % 109 1.59 2.99 118 1.88 3.42 -0.29 
Left Alliance % 109 8.62 8.73 118 8.17 8.48 0.45 
Swedish Party % 109 3.08 13.22 118 3.80 15.97 -0.72 
True Finns % 109 2.04 4.90 118 1.77 3.99 0.28 
Christian Democrats % 109 3.06 3.84 118 2.95 4.15 0.11 
Other parties % 109 3.89 6.96 118 2.91 6.17 0.98 
ε = 0.4               
Incumbents % 588 57.26 9.16 557 57.29 8.85 -0.04 
Women % 588 34.72 8.76 557 33.18 8.40 1.54** 
High professionals % 588 23.34 12.84 557 22.06 11.83 1.27 
University educated % 588 14.57 10.72 557 13.47 10.07 1.11 
Unemployed % 588 3.47 3.88 557 3.43 3.99 0.04 
Center Party % 588 38.26 20.88 557 38.48 21.00 -0.22 
Coalition Party % 588 17.80 10.57 557 16.77 10.64 1.03 
Social Democratic Party % 588 20.33 11.27 557 20.62 11.23 -0.29 
Green party % 588 2.41 4.05 557 2.02 3.47 0.39 
Left Alliance % 588 8.37 8.12 557 8.19 8.04 0.18 
Swedish Party % 588 4.40 15.85 557 5.65 18.36 -1.25 
True Finns % 588 1.86 4.16 557 1.69 3.76 0.17 
Christian Democrats % 588 3.07 3.86 557 3.28 3.91 -0.21 
Other parties % 588 3.49 6.74 557 3.30 6.30 0.19 
Notes: The statistical significance of the differences is tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the municipality-level. ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.  
 
Table B3. In this table, we analyze whether municipal employees increase public expenditures because they 
are more often female or because there is a municipal employee effect independent of gender. To address 
this question, we explore whether the council seat share of municipal employees increases municipal 
spending also when the gender composition of the marginal seats is accounted for. To this end, we directly 
control for the seat share of females (Females). We instrument this potentially endogenous share by the 
share of females who were randomly elected in the close contests. This instrument is calculated using the 
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procedure that produced the instrument for the share of municipal employees. We present validity checks for 
the instrument for female seat share in Appendix F. 
 When female seat share is included in the model, we get at the effect of electing a municipal employee 
while keeping the gender composition of the council constant. The effect then refers to either electing a male 
municipal employee instead of a male with another occupation or a female municipal employee instead of a 
female with another occupation. When included and properly instrumented, female seat share in turn 
captures the treatment effect of randomly electing a woman instead of a man into the council, keeping the 
share of municipal employees constant. 
We have reproduced the estimations of Table 4, but with the seat share of females included. As can be 
seen from Table B3, adding the seat share of females has only a minor impact on the treatment effect 
estimate of the municipal employees: With IV, we find a statistically significant treatment effect of 0.0032 – 
0.0035; with the reduced form model the corresponding figures are 0.0030 – 0.0031. In contrast to 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) and Clots-Figueras (2011), who find that increased female participation 
matter for the type of public spending in India, we find no robust effects from (randomly) increased female 
political participation, especially when the full set of controls is included. An obvious explanation for this 
weaker and less robust female effect is that women’s position in Finland and India are quite different: 
Women are well represented in Finnish political decision making. Indeed, Finland was third in the world to 
allow female suffrage in 1906 and in our data, the share of female councilors is about 40%.   
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Table B3. Results for total expenditures: IV analysis for both municipal employee and female instruments. 
Panel A: IV, ε = 0.4 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Municipal employees 0.0014 0.0032* 0.0034** 0.0035** 
  [0.0022] [0.0019] [0.0016] [0.0016] 
First stage Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 28.54 30.21 29.99 145.66 
Females 0.0041** 0.0032** 0.0013 0.016 
  [0.0019] [0.0016] [0.0013] [0.012] 
First stage Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 83.55 86.33 84.55 188.98 
Panel B: Reduced form of IV, ε = 0.4 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Municipal employees 0.0017 0.0030* 0.0037** 0.0030** 
  [0.0018] [0.0016] [0.0014] [0.0014] 
Females 0.0044** 0.0038** 0.0018 0.017 
  [0.0017] [0.0015] [0.0013] [0.013] 
R2 0.29 0.43 0.57 0.59 
N 1544 1544 1544 1544 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Party controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls No No Yes Yes 
Vote share No No No Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable in all the models is the logarithm of 
the mean of per capita total expenditures over the council term. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported 
in brackets. Party controls include parties' lagged seat shares. Municipality controls include lagged population, squared population 
and shares of young and old citizens. The first stage Angrist-Pischke F-statistics of individual endogenous regressors are produced 
by the ivreg2 command in STATA. ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 % statistical significance levels respectively.  
 
Figure B4. In Figure B4, we plot the IV estimates of the effect of municipal employee councilors on 
expenditures and respective 95 % confidence intervals using varying bandwidths (ε). We vary the window 
for individual level closeness between 0 and 0.4, i.e. the smallest and the largest bandwidth that we use in 
our main text. The estimates remain rather stable across this range of bandwidths. 
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Figure B4. Robustness of the total expenditures IV effect with respect to bandwidth choice. 
Notes: The solid line represents the point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence interval. The specification includes 
year dummies as well as controls for parties' seat shares, population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens (all 
controls are lagged). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
 
Figures B5 and B6. In these figures, we analyze the expenditure effects separately for each year instead of 
the mean over the whole council term (as done in the main text). These by-year estimates are all significant 
for the council term of interest, and similar in magnitude to the main results. We have also run by-year 
placebo regressions (four years prior to the council term of interest), and the estimates are insignificant, as 
they should. A slightly worrying observation is that the placebo point estimates are quite large even though 
they are statistically insignificant. Further analysis revealed that this finding is driven solely by the last 
election term in the data. When we omit that election from the analysis the placebo estimates are closer to 
zero but comfortingly the estimates of key interest to us remain in this restricted sample very similar (see 
Figure B4) to those we report in the main text.  
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Figure B5. IV effects separately for each year. 
Notes: The dots represent the point estimates and the grey lines the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. We report the effects 
municipal employee representation on log of total expenditures for each year’s expenditures separately. Time = 0 denotes the 
election year and years 1–4 the actual council term in office (separated by the red lines). The specification includes year dummies 
as well as controls for the parties' seat shares, population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens (all controls are 
lagged). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.  
 
Figure B6. IV effects separately for each year excluding data from the last election term. 
Notes: The dots represent the point estimates and the grey lines the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. We report the effects 
municipal employee representation on log of total expenditures for each year’s expenditures separately. Time = 0 denotes the 
election year and years 1–4 the actual council term in office (separated by the red lines). The specification includes year dummies 
as well as controls for the parties' seat shares, population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens (all controls are 
lagged). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.  
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Figure B7. In Figure B7, we report graphically the results from placebo thresholds analysis. Here, we move 
the within-party threshold of getting elected by steps of 0.05 when constructing the instrument (as described 
in the main text). Notice that when we artificially change the election thresholds, also the council size and 
the council composition artificially change. Therefore, at each of the artificial thresholds, we compute the 
respective placebo council sizes, seat shares of elected municipal employees and our instruments. For the 
first stage results reported in the left graph, we regress the actual municipal employee council share on the 
placebo instruments. As expected, the placebo results fluctuate around zero. One placebo estimate is 
statistically different from zero, but small in magnitude. Given multiple testing, this is not surprising. For the 
IV results, we use a different first stage, however. For the IV to have any chance of producing non-zero 
effects, we also use the artificial council share of municipal employees as the endogenous variable of 
interest instead of the real share and instrument it with the placebo instrument. Using the placebo seat share 
ensures that the first stage of the placebo IV is relevant, as there is one-to-one relationship between the 
placebo seat share and the placebo instrument even at the fake cut-offs. Both placebo tests are conducted 
using ε = 0.4 as the bandwidth. 
 
 
Figure B7. Effects for placebo thresholds.  
Notes: The left graph reports the first stage and the right graph the second stage IV estimates. The x-axis measures distance of the 
placebo threshold from the actual election threshold. The red line corresponds to the actual election threshold. The dots represent 
the point estimates and the grey lines the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. We report the effects of municipal employee 
representation on log of total expenditures. The specification includes year dummies as well as controls for the parties' seat shares, 
population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens (all controls are lagged). Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. 
 
 
Table B4. In this table, we provide a comparison between municipalities with and without close elections. 
These groups are rather similar for the narrowest bandwidth, but differences show up in the case of the 
largest bandwidth that we use.  
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Table B4. Pre-treatment covariate balance between the close sample and others.  
  Close elections No close elections 
ε = 0 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 143 5 320 893 968 5 346 843 -26 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 143 1 628 362 965 1 638 375 -10 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 143 3 692 727 965 3 708 690 -16 
Population 227 8 686 12 762 1317 13 184 37 979 -4 498 
Young inhabitants % 227 18.75 3.35 1317 18.45 3.34 0.29 
Old inhabitants % 227 18.04 4.60 1317 18.35 4.63 -0.32 
Council size 227 27.82 9.68 1317 29.18 11.09 -1.36 
Municipal employees % 143 28.20 12.75 965 27.53 13.40 0.66 
Municipal health care employees % 143 7.60 4.98 965 6.95 5.00 0.65 
Municipal non-health care employees % 143 20.59 11.36 965 20.58 12.63 0.01 
Incumbents % 143 56.89 8.55 965 57.22 9.07 -0.32 
Women % 143 34.05 8.95 965 32.82 8.93 1.23 
High professionals % 143 19.17 10.72 965 20.80 12.08 -1.63 
University educated % 143 11.08 7.52 965 12.25 9.69 -1.17 
Unemployed % 143 3.43 3.96 965 3.89 4.15 -0.46 
Center Party seat share % 227 40.51 19.73 1317 39.21 21.40 1.31 
Coalition Party seat share % 227 16.10 9.89 1317 15.61 10.46 0.49 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 227 20.66 10.82 1317 20.75 11.93 -0.09 
Green party seat share % 227 1.70 3.33 1317 1.87 3.50 -0.16 
Left Alliance seat share % 227 9.18 8.78 1317 8.43 8.31 0.75 
Swedish Party seat share % 227 3.53 14.83 1317 5.69 18.55 -2.16 
True Finns seat share % 227 2.21 4.38 1317 1.67 3.83 0.54 
Christian Democrats seat share % 227 2.87 3.75 1317 2.91 3.72 -0.04 
Other parties seat share % 227 3.24 6.55 1317 3.88 9.09 -0.64 
ε = 0.4 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 810 5 330 919 301 5 376 919 -46 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 807 1 634 369 301 1 646 369 -12 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 807 3 697 768 301 3 729 768 -33 
Population 1145 15 571 3 153 399 3 773 3 153 11799*** 
Young inhabitants % 1145 18.65 3.51 399 18.07 3.51 0.58* 
Old inhabitants % 1145 17.70 4.42 399 20.04 4.42 -2.34*** 
Council size 1145 31.25 5.75 399 22.45 5.75 8.80*** 
Municipal employees % 807 28.03 13.48 301 26.50 13.48 1.53* 
Municipal health care employees % 807 7.26 5.11 301 6.44 5.11 0.82* 
Municipal non-health care employees % 807 20.78 12.67 301 20.06 12.67 0.72 
Incumbents % 807 57.66 9.40 301 55.87 9.40 1.80*** 
Women % 807 33.41 9.38 301 31.82 9.38 1.59** 
High professionals % 807 22.43 8.84 301 15.64 8.84 6.79*** 
University educated % 807 13.51 6.61 301 8.31 6.61 5.20*** 
Unemployed % 807 3.69 4.63 301 4.18 4.63 -0.49 
Center Party seat share % 1145 37.38 20.08 399 45.20 20.08 7.82*** 
Coalition Party seat share % 1145 16.56 10.68 399 13.15 10.68 3.41*** 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 1145 21.63 11.60 399 18.16 11.60 3.47*** 
Green party seat share % 1145 2.16 2.32 399 0.92 2.32 1.25*** 
Left Alliance seat share % 1145 9.02 7.86 399 7.15 7.86 1.87** 
Swedish Party seat share % 1145 5.10 20.03 399 6.14 20.03 -1.03 
True Finns seat share % 1145 1.74 4.13 399 1.79 4.13 -0.05 
Christian Democrats seat share % 1145 3.06 3.96 399 2.44 3.96 0.62* 
Other parties seat share % 1145 3.34 13.29 399 5.05 13.29 -1.70* 
Notes: The statistical significance is tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.  
 
Table B5. In this table, we present results from regressions where we have excluded the municipalities 
without close elections. We obtain results that are very similar to what our main analysis produces.  
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Table B5. The effect of municipal employee council share on total expenditures using only the close 
elections sample.  
Panel A: IV, ε = 0.4 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Municipal employees 0.0035* 0.0040*** 0.0040*** 0.0040*** 
  [0.0019] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015]    
First stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 54.25 57.76 58.76 59.76 
N 1145 1145 1145 1145 
Panel B: Reduced form of IV, ε = 0.4 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Municipal employees 0.0032* 0.0042*** 0.0037*** 0.0035** 
  [0.0017] [0.0016] [0.0014] [0.0014]    
R2 0.30 0.42 0.58 0.59 
N 1145 1145 1145 1145 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Party controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls No No Yes Yes 
Vote share No No No Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable in all the models is the logarithm of 
the mean of per capita total expenditures over the council term. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported 
in brackets. Party controls include parties' lagged seat shares. Municipality controls include lagged population, squared population 
and shares of young and old citizens. Vote share control is a second-order polynomial of municipal employees' vote share. ***, ** 
and * denote 1, 5 and 10 % statistical significance levels respectively. 
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Online Appendix C: Robustness and Validity of the Party and Council Size Effect 
Heterogeneity 
 
Figures C1 and C2. In these figures, we present the first stage of IV for the instrument in the largest and the 
second largest party using various bandwidths while first controlling only for the year fixed effect and then 
using all municipality controls. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that it is unity regardless of the 
bandwidth size.  
 
 
Figure C1. First stage of IV for municipal employees in the largest party. 
Notes: The solid line represents the first stage point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence interval. The left hand 
graph includes only the year dummies as controls. The right hand graph includes year dummies, parties' lagged seat shares, 
municipality population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens (all lagged). Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. 
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Figure C2. First stage of IV for municipal employees in the second largest party. 
Notes: The solid line represents the first stage point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence interval. The left hand 
graph includes only the year dummies as controls. The right hand graph includes year dummies, parties' lagged seat shares, 
municipality population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens (all lagged). Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. 
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Table C1. In Table C1, we check that the instruments constructed for the largest and the second party are 
as-good-as-random by comparing differences in pre-treatment means between the municipalities with 
positive and negative instruments. There are no statistically significant differences between the groups. This 
supports the validity of our design. 
 
Table C1. Pre-treatment covariate balance at municipality level for the largest and second largest party.  
  Tmt > 0 Tmt < 0   
Panel A: Largest party               
ε = 0.4 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 310 5,404 829 297 5,353 805 52 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 309 1,653 400 296 1,624 369 28 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 309 3,757 695 296 3,726 649 31 
Population 444 17,292 39,050 426 15,576 44,918 1716 
Young inhabitants % 444 18.74 3.48 426 18.78 3.32 -0.05 
Old inhabitants % 444 17.59 4.59 426 17.70 4.49 -0.12 
Council size 444 32.32 11.70 426 30.97 11.35 1.34 
Municipal employees % 309 28.82 13.41 296 28.00 12.92 0.82 
Municipal health care employees % 309 7.14 4.75 296 7.24 4.98 -0.10 
Municipal non health care employees % 309 21.68 12.74 296 20.76 12.00 0.92 
Incumbents % 309 57.52 8.86 296 57.73 9.09 -0.21 
Women % 309 33.13 9.43 296 33.13 8.67 0.00 
High professionals % 309 23.23 12.89 296 22.27 12.33 0.95 
University educated % 309 13.78 10.45 296 13.40 9.99 0.39 
Unemployed % 309 3.66 3.93 296 3.67 3.92 -0.01 
Panel B: 2nd largest party               
ε = 0.4 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 148 5,231 710 132 5,307 776 -76 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 148 1,607 349 130 1,637 311 -30 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 148 3,620 537 130 3,677 628 -57 
Population 212 31,485 73,880 185 23,460 53,487 8025 
Young inhabitants % 212 18.41 2.97 185 18.50 2.90 -0.08 
Old inhabitants % 212 16.82 4.62 185 16.95 4.56 -0.13 
Council size 212 36.77 13.63 185 34.76 12.84 2.01 
Municipal employees % 148 29.63 14.21 130 27.72 12.45 1.90 
Municipal health care employees % 148 7.93 4.70 130 7.01 4.24 0.92 
Municipal non health care employees % 148 21.69 13.24 130 20.71 12.09 0.98 
Incumbents % 148 59.33 7.95 130 58.48 8.25 0.85 
Women % 148 35.41 8.26 130 34.40 8.09 1.01 
High professionals % 148 27.07 14.30 130 25.37 13.47 1.71 
University educated % 148 17.57 12.00 130 14.96 11.22 2.60 
Unemployed % 148 3.48 3.64 130 3.04 3.14 0.44 
Notes: The statistical significance is tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.  
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Figure C3. In Figure C3, we report the spending effect for the largest and the second largest party, 
respectively, using various bandwidths. The results for the largest party are quite stable across 
specifications. 
 
 
Figure C3. Robustness of the party heterogeneity result to bandwidth choice. 
Notes: The solid line represents the first stage point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence interval. The specifications 
includes year dummies as well as controls for parties' seat shares, population, squared population and shares of young and old 
citizens (all controls are lagged). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
 
Figure C4. In Figure C4, we report the spending effect for the small (council size ≤ 27) and large councils 
(council size > 27), respectively, using various bandwidths.  
 
 
Figure C4. Robustness of the council size heterogeneity result to bandwidth choice. 
Notes: The solid line represents the first stage point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence interval. We do not report 
confidence intervals in the right hand graph for the smallest bandwidths, because they get very large. The specifications includes 
year dummies as well as controls for parties' seat shares, population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens (all 
controls are lagged). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
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Table C2. In Table C2, we analyze whether the party and council size results for the total expenditures hold 
when instrumenting also for the female share. These results are largely in line with those presented in the 
main text also when the (instrumented) female seat share is included. 
 
Table C2. Results for total expenditures by party and council size: IV analysis for both municipal employee 
and female instruments. 
  
Council size  
≤ 27 
Council size > 
27 
Largest 
party 
2nd largest 
party 
Panel A: IV, ε = 0.4 (3) (4) (1) (2) 
Municipal employees 0.0066** -0.0003 0.0033 0.0028 
  [0.0028] [0.0023] [0.0021] [0.0034] 
First stage Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 15.32 15.90 37.74 20.52 
Females 0.0000 0.0018 0.0035* -0.0033 
  [0.0018] [0.0021] [0.0019] [0.0034] 
First stage Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 53.38 28.96 68.78 34.52 
Panel B: Reduced form of IV, ε = 0.4 (7) (8) (5) (6) 
Municipal employees 0.0046*** -0.0004 0.0037* 0.0024 
  [0.0017] [0.0024] [0.0020] [0.0033] 
Females 0.0013 0.0016 0.0034** -0.0027 
  [0.0016] [0.0019] [0.0017] [0.0030] 
R2 0.59 0.60 0.56 0.57 
N 1017 527 1469 1235 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Party and municipality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable in all the models is the logarithm of 
the mean of per capita total expenditures over the council term. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported 
in brackets. Party controls include parties' lagged seat shares. Municipality controls include lagged population, squared population 
and shares of young and old citizens. The reported first stage Angrist-Pischke F-statistics of individual endogenous regressors are 
produced by the ivreg2 command in STATA. ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 % statistical significance levels respectively.  
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Table C3. In Table C3, we report sectoral results by party size. The results suggest that also the sectoral 
results seem to be driven by within party influence when the party is large. While we cannot statistically 
distinguish the estimates from each other, the pattern of the results is in line with the analysis in the main 
text. 
 
Table C3. Results for sectoral expenditures by party size. 
  
Outcome: health care 
expenditures 
Outcome: non health 
care expenditures 
  
Largest 
party 
2nd largest 
party 
Largest 
party 
2nd largest 
party 
Panel A: IV, ε = 0.4 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Health care employees 0.0145** -0.0007 0.0005 0.0091 
  [0.0066] [0.0105] [0.0041] [0.0087] 
First stage Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 37.63 12.05 37.63 12.05 
Non health care employees 0.0041 0.0009 0.0051** -0.0011 
  [0.0050] [0.0039] [0.0025] [0.0045] 
First stage Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 45.52 23.00 45.52 23.00 
Panel B: Reduced form of IV, ε = 0.4 (3) (4) (3) (4) 
Health care employees 0.0117** -0.0006 -0.0008 0.0059 
  [0.0051] [0.0065] [0.0035] [0.0052] 
Non health care employees 0.0055 0.0011 0.0057** -0.0017 
  [0.0057] [0.0045] [0.0029] [0.0053] 
R2 0.17 0.15 0.42 0.43 
N 1459 1226 1459 1226 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Party and municipality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable is either the logarithm of the mean 
of per capita other than health care expenditures or health care expenditures over the council term. Standard errors are clustered at 
the municipality level and reported in brackets. Party controls include parties' lagged seat shares. Municipality controls include 
lagged population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens. The reported first stage Angrist-Pischke F-statistics 
of individual endogenous regressors are produced by the ivreg2 command in STATA. ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 % 
statistical significance levels respectively. 
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Figure D2. First stage of IV for municipal non-health sector employees. 
Notes: The solid line represents the first stage point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence interval. The left hand 
graph includes only the year dummies as controls. The right hand graph includes year dummies, parties' lagged seat shares, 
municipality population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens (all lagged). Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. 
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Tables D1 and D2. In Tables D1 and D2, we check that the sector-specific instruments are as-good-as-
random. We divide the data into two groups, based on the seat share of municipal employees exceeding (Tmt 
> 0) or falling short of (Tmt < 0) its expectation and test whether the difference in means is statistically 
significant. There are no statistically significant differences between the groups. This  supports the validity 
of our design. 
 
Table D1. Pre-treatment covariate balance at municipality level for non-health care employees.  
  Tmt > 0 Tmt < 0   
ε = 0.4 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 334 5 330 810 359 5 363 808 -33 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 333 1 626 384 357 1 633 364 -7 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 333 3 708 685 357 3 729 655 -21 
Population 522 18 381 48 476 496 15 341 36 231 3 041 
Young inhabitants % 522 18.77 3.22 496 18.67 3.31 0.10 
Old inhabitants % 522 17.21 4.54 496 17.76 4.52 -0.56 
Council size 522 32.71 11.78 496 31.30 11.41 1.41 
Municipal employees % 333 28.82 13.23 357 27.81 13.62 1.01 
Municipal health care employees % 333 7.34 4.72 357 7.03 4.88 0.31 
Municipal non-health care employees % 333 21.48 12.60 357 20.78 12.28 0.70 
Instrument for non-health care employees 333 0.18 0.11 357 0.09 0.11 0.09 
Incumbents % 333 57.90 8.40 357 57.99 8.97 -0.09 
Women % 333 33.76 9.18 357 33.13 8.48 0.63 
High professionals % 333 24.00 12.80 357 22.71 12.71 1.29 
University educated % 333 14.43 10.43 357 13.77 10.20 0.66 
Unemployed % 333 3.79 3.93 357 3.57 3.98 0.22 
Center Party seat share % 522 36.03 21.10 496 37.59 21.45 -1.56 
Coalition Party seat share % 522 17.45 9.94 496 15.93 10.32 1.52 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 522 22.46 12.12 496 21.18 11.38 1.29 
Green party seat share % 522 2.52 4.00 496 2.09 3.66 0.43 
Left Alliance seat share % 522 9.39 8.74 496 8.90 8.30 0.49 
Swedish Party seat share % 522 3.98 14.97 496 5.85 18.69 -1.88 
True Finns seat share % 522 1.97 4.19 496 1.66 3.64 0.31 
Christian Democrats seat share % 522 3.04 3.56 496 3.20 3.59 -0.16 
Notes: The statistical significance is tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.  
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Table D2. Pre-treatment covariate balance for health care employees. 
  Tmt > 0 Tmt < 0   
ε = 0.4 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 222 5 314 790 227 5 234 777 79.21 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 222 1 642 381 226 1 588 348 54.06 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 222 3 668 579 226 3 648 675 19.76 
Population 305 23 734 60 686 319 18 758 43 304 4 976 
Young inhabitants % 305 18.57 3.17 319 18.94 3.26 -0.37 
Old inhabitants % 305 17.13 4.75 319 16.96 4.33 0.17 
Council size 305 34.48 12.77 319 33.10 11.80 1.38 
Municipal employees % 222 30.60 14.60 226 28.77 12.32 1.83 
Municipal health care employees % 222 8.16 5.30 226 8.00 4.68 0.15 
Instrument for health care employees 222 0.09 0.08 226 -0.11 0.08 0.20* 
Municipal non-health care employees % 222 22.44 13.45 226 20.77 11.95 1.67 
Incumbents % 222 59.18 8.72 226 57.74 8.68 1.44 
Women % 222 34.02 8.59 226 34.48 8.64 -0.46 
High professionals % 222 24.96 13.68 226 24.94 12.69 0.02 
University educated % 222 15.74 10.61 226 15.10 10.92 0.64 
Unemployed % 222 3.57 3.47 226 3.43 3.77 0.14 
Center Party seat share % 305 34.51 21.18 319 35.14 20.90 -0.63 
Coalition Party seat share % 305 17.21 9.88 319 17.75 10.09 -0.54 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 305 22.95 11.65 319 22.69 11.79 0.26 
Green party seat share % 305 2.99 4.44 319 2.44 4.03 0.56 
Left Alliance seat share % 305 9.37 8.41 319 9.31 8.45 0.06 
Swedish Party seat share % 305 4.85 16.61 319 4.29 16.53 0.56 
True Finns seat share % 305 1.44 2.95 319 1.67 3.89 -0.23 
Christian Democrats seat share % 305 3.24 3.56 319 3.22 3.40 0.02 
 Notes: The statistical significance is tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.  
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Figures D3 and D4. In  Figures D3 and D4, we report the effect of health care and non-health care 
employees on non-health care and health care spending, respectively, using various bandwidths. The results 
for the non-health outcome are rather stable across specifications. 
 
 
Figure D3. Robustness of the non-health expenditures results with respect to bandwidth choice. 
Notes: The solid line represents the point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence interval. The specification includes 
year dummies as well as control for parties' seat shares, population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens (all 
controls are lagged). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.  
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Figure D4. Robustness of the health expenditures results with respect to bandwidth choice. 
Notes: The solid line represents the point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence interval. The specification includes 
year dummies as well as control for parties' seat shares, population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens (all 
controls are lagged). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.  
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Table D3. In Table D3, we show robustness to accounting for the correlation between the municipal 
employee status and gender by instrumenting also for the female seat share in the council. While the IV 
results are not statistically significant (Panel A), the reduced form estimations deliver very similar estimates 
to the ones reported in the main text. All in all, also the sectoral results appear to be robust to the inclusion 
of the (instrumented) female seat share. 
 
Table D3. Results for sectoral expenditures: IV analysis with ε = 0.4 for both sectoral municipal employee 
and female instruments. 
  
Outcome: non health 
care expenditures 
Outcome: health care 
expenditures 
Panel A: IV, ε = 0.4 (1) (2) 
Municipal non health care employees 0.0037 0.0006 
  [0.0023] [0.0038] 
First stage Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 20.36 20.36 
Municipal health care employees 0.0033 0.0062 
  [0.0034] [0.0038] 
First stage Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 22.72 22.72 
Female 0.0018 0.0028 
  [0.0017] [0.0032] 
First stage Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 57.57 57.57 
Panel B: Reduced form of IV, ε = 0.4 (3) (4) 
Municipal non health care employees 0.0038* 0.0012 
  [0.0020] [0.0035] 
Municipal health care employees 0.0020 0.0056* 
  [0.0031] [0.0034] 
Female 0.0024 0.003 
  [0.0017] [0.0031] 
R2 0.43 0.18 
N 1534 1534 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Party and municipality controls Yes Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable in all the models is the logarithm of 
the mean of per capita total expenditures over the council term. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported 
in brackets. Party controls include parties' lagged seat shares. Municipality controls include lagged population, squared population 
and shares of young and old citizens. The reported first stage Angrist-Pischke F-statistics of individual endogenous regressors are 
produced by the ivreg2 command in STATA. ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 % statistical significance levels respectively. 
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Online Appendix E: Rent-Seeking Results 
 
Table E1. In this table, we report results concerning whether municipal employees enjoy larger returns to 
office in terms of receiving larger salary increases and/or facing smaller unemployment risk, and whether 
they benefit from a larger incumbency advantage than the other candidates. To do so, we regress a dummy 
variable for getting elected at election period t on four different outcomes: change in (log) wage from t to 
t+1, being unemployed in t+1, getting elected in t+1 and vote share in t+1. We control for individual 
characteristics in some of the specifications. These controls include gender, age, incumbency status, 
unemployment status, student dummy, entrepreneur dummy, high professional dummy, party affiliation and 
vote share t–1. We estimate the effect separately for municipal employees and other candidates and use a 
sample of candidates who were tied for the last seat within their party list (“lottery sample”). Thus, the 
treatment status is randomized in these regressions (see Hyytinen et al. 2017 for details). We do not find any 
statistically significant differences between municipal employee politicians and others in terms of the returns 
to office.  
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Table E1. Returns to office for elected municipal employees and other candidates. 
  Panel A: Change in log(income) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Elected 
0.0757 0.0047  -0.1843 -0.1548 
[0.0760] [0.0725]  [0.1570] [0.1661] 
N 148 148  521 521 
R2 0.01 0.21  0.00 0.05 
  Panel B: Unemployed t+1 
  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Elected 
0.0104 0.0046  0.0033 -0.0006 
[0.0219] [0.0228]  [0.0123] [0.0124] 
N 202 202  584 584 
R2 0.00 0.04  0.00 0.11 
  Panel C: Elected t+1 
  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Elected 
0.0373 0.0332  0.0027 0.0043 
[0.0508] [0.0521]  [0.0288] [0.0291] 
N 324 324  974 974 
R2 0.00 0.05  0.00 0.04 
  Panel D: Vote share t+1 
  (13) (14)  (15) (16) 
Elected 
0.0966 0.0207  -0.0518 -0.0519 
[0.1372] [0.1348]  [0.0887] [0.0854] 
N 197 197  594 594 
R2 0.00 0.18  0.00 0.23 
Sample Municipal employees  Other candidates 
Individual characteristics No Yes  No Yes 
Notes: Unit of observation is individual candidate at election period t. Individual characteristics include gender, age, incumbency 
status, unemployment status, student dummy, entrepreneur dummy, high professional dummy, party affiliation and vote share at 
t–1. In panel B, we include only the candidates that are employed at time t to make the other candidates group comparable to 
municipal employees group. In panel C, candidates who do not re-run have elected t+1 status of zero. In panel D, those who do 
not re-run are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses.  
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Figure E1. In Figure E1, we plot the regression discontinuity estimates across a wide range of bandwidths 
for the same outcomes as reported in Table E1. As already suggested by Table E1, there are no statistically 
(or economically) significant differences between municipal employee and other politicians’ outcomes. 
 
Panel A: RDD effect of getting elected at t on change in log of wage income for a range of bandwidths.  
 
Panel B: RDD effect of getting elected at t on unemployment at t+1 for a range of bandwidths. 
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Panel C: RDD effect of getting elected at t on elected at t+1 for a range of bandwidths. 
 
Panel D: RDD effect of getting elected at t on vote share at t+1 for a range of bandwidths. 
 
Figure E1. RDD estimates for returns to office for a wide range of bandwidths. 
Notes: The solid line represents the point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence interval. The results are from the 
conventional local linear RD specifications for various bandwidths. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. In all 
the panels, the left hand graph applies to the sample of municipal employees and right hand graph for the other candidates. The 
red line marks the (clustered) MSE-optimal bandwidth (Calonico et al. 2016).  
 
Table E2. We then turn to our analysis of municipal house prices. We exclude 309 municipality-election 
period observations from the sample because these small municipalities do not have many housing market 
transactions. Table E2 reports the effect of municipal employees on (log) house price per square meter. We 
find no effect on house prices. 
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Table E2. Results for house prices. 
Outcome: log(house price per m2)  
Reduced form of IV, ε = 0.4 IV 
Reduced 
form of IV 
Municipal employees -0.0001  
  [0.0020]  
Municipal employees -0.0001 
  [0.0020] 
First stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 64.71  
R2 0.77 
N 1235 1235 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the mean of per 
square meter house prices over the council term. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in 
parentheses. Controls include year dummies, parties' lagged seat shares, municipality population, squared population and shares of 
young and old citizens (all lagged). ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 % statistical significance levels respectively. 
 
Figure E2. In Figure E2 we explore the stated preferences of municipal employee candidates and the 
candidates from other occupations with respect to questions concerning the role of municipal employees in 
local politics. We use survey data from the Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE) concerning the 2012 
municipal elections. The data are from an election aid survey in which both candidates and voters respond to 
the same set of questions and the software application provides voters with information on the best matches.  
Firstly, according to Figure E2, municipal employees oppose more strongly firing of municipal 
employees in connection with municipal mergers compared to other candidates. In particular, there is a rule 
in Finland which prevents municipalities from dismissing (redundant) employees during the period of five 
years after a municipal merger. Municipal employees who run for a council disagree more often with the 
statement that this period is too long. Secondly, they oppose more strongly restrictions on nomination of 
municipal employees in municipal boards. 
Furthermore, in a recent article that dealt with the political power of public sector employees in 
Finnish municipal councils, the Finnish National Broadcasting company YLE also cited the survey answers 
given by municipal council election candidates. For example, YLE reported that “80% of those candidates 
that are municipal employees think that privatization of health services brings neither efficiency gains nor 
savings to municipalities. 67% of other candidates shared this opinion.” 
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Figure E2. Survey responses (N = 4215). 
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Online Appendix F: Validity of the Female Instrument 
 
Figure F1. In this figure, we present the first stage of IV for the female instrument using various bandwidths 
while first controlling only for the year fixed effect (figure on the left) and then using all municipality and 
party controls (figure on the right). We cannot reject the null hypothesis that it is unity regardless of the 
bandwidth size.  
 
 
Figure F1. First stage of IV for the female instrument. 
Notes: The solid line represents the first stage point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence interval. The left hand 
graph includes only the year dummies as controls. The right hand graph includes year dummies, parties' lagged seat shares, 
municipality population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens (all lagged). Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. 
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Table F1. In this table, we demonstrate that the pre-treatment covariates are balanced also for the female 
instrument (Fmt).  
 
Table F1. Pre-treatment covariate balance at municipality level for female instrument. 
  Fmt > 0 Fmt < 0   
ε = 0.4 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 428 5 382 863 485 5 272 778 110.00 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 427 1 653 361 483 1 623 366 29.95 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 427 3 729 678 483 3 649 635 79.90 
Population 596 14 154 33 116 674 14 708 43 222 -553.71 
Young inhabitants % 596 18.53 3.20 674 18.83 3.39 -0.30 
Old inhabitants % 596 17.98 4.59 674 17.72 4.48 0.26 
Council size 596 30.62 11.30 674 30.36 11.09 0.26 
Municipal employees % 427 28.85 13.73 483 27.34 12.79 1.51* 
Municipal health care employees % 427 7.14 5.08 483 7.30 4.83 -0.16 
Municipal non-health care employees % 427 21.71 12.80 483 20.04 11.90 1.66 
Incumbents % 427 57.53 8.85 483 57.46 8.87 0.07 
Women % 427 33.14 8.69 483 33.24 8.65 -0.10 
Instrument for women 427 -0.05 0.12 483 -0.29 0.11 0.24 
High professionals % 427 21.23 11.72 483 22.41 12.48 -1.17 
University educated % 427 12.77 9.47 483 13.18 10.07 -0.41 
Unemployed % 427 3.78 4.19 483 3.81 3.95 -0.03 
Center Party seat share % 596 38.22 21.51 674 38.22 21.44 0.00 
Coalition Party seat share % 596 16.13 10.47 674 16.19 10.31 -0.06 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 596 21.03 11.61 674 21.30 11.98 -0.27 
Green party seat share % 596 2.03 3.50 674 2.04 3.76 0.00 
Left Alliance seat share % 596 9.18 8.52 674 8.59 8.43 0.59 
Swedish Party seat share % 596 4.98 16.97 674 5.91 19.18 -0.93 
True Finns seat share % 596 1.78 3.91 674 1.62 3.86 0.15 
Christian Democrats seat share % 596 2.89 3.68 674 3.01 3.71 -0.12 
Notes: The statistical significance is tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.  
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